










EuropeAid – Implementing the Tax and Development policy agenda 






A project implemented by 
PwC 
This project was commissioned by the European 
Commission within the framework of its Tax and 
Development policy agenda with support of the 
European Parliament 
The European Union 
 Transfer pricing and developing countries 
                                       




List of figures and tables  .......................................................................................................................................................................... III 
Abbreviations and acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................................  IV 
1.  Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................. 1 
2.  Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 
3.  About this report .................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 
4.  The importance and pitfalls of TP ...................................................................................................................................................... 8 
5.  Activities by international organisations in the field of TP  ............................................................................................................ 10 
5.1.  The OECD Guidelines ......................................................................................................................................................................... 10 
5.2.  The UN TP Manual .............................................................................................................................................................................. 12 
5.3.  The work of other international organisations ...................................................................................................................................... 13 
6.  Preconditions for TP reform ............................................................................................................................................................. 13 
7.  Selected countries and TP reform  .................................................................................................................................................... 15 
7.1.  Introductory remarks ............................................................................................................................................................................ 15 
7.2.  Economic and political preconditions ................................................................................................................................................... 15 
7.2.1.  GDP growth, economic sectors and financial markets ...................................................................................................... 15 
7.2.2.  Trade liberalisation and international business relationships ............................................................................................ 18 
7.2.3.  FDI and the importance of MNEs in local economies ....................................................................................................... 19 
7.3.  Legal preconditions .............................................................................................................................................................................. 20 
7.3.1.  Corporate income taxation and special tax regimes ......................................................................................................... 20 
7.3.2.  Existing network of tax treaties ......................................................................................................................................... 21 
7.3.3.  Existing TP legislation in selected countries ..................................................................................................................... 22 
7.3.3.1.  Introductory remarks: state of play in selected countries .................................................................................................. 22 
7.3.3.2.  TP legislation in selected countries ................................................................................................................................... 22 
7.3.3.3.  Scope of TP legislation in place ........................................................................................................................................ 24 
7.3.3.4.  TP documentation requirements ....................................................................................................................................... 25 
7.4.  Capacities of local tax administrations ................................................................................................................................................. 26 
7.4.1.  Public debt and revenue collection ................................................................................................................................... 26 
7.4.2.  Structure and capacities of local  tax administrations ....................................................................................................... 26 
7.4.3.  Experience with TP enforcement, audits and penalties .................................................................................................... 27 
7.4.4.  Internal training facilities and communication channels .................................................................................................... 28 
7.5.  Interim conclusions: suitability for donor support in TP reform ............................................................................................................ 29 Transfer pricing and developing countries 
                                       
II | P a g e  
 
8.  Recommendations for future donor support in selected countries ............................................................................................. 31 
8.1.  Introductory remarks ............................................................................................................................................................................ 31 
8.2.  Universal and country-specific recommendations ............................................................................................................................... 32 
8.2.1.  Universal recommendations for selected countries .......................................................................................................... 32 
8.2.2.  Country-specific recommendations: Kenya ....................................................................................................................... 33 
8.2.3.  Country-specific recommendations: Ghana ...................................................................................................................... 34 
8.2.4.  Country-specific recommendations: Honduras ................................................................................................................. 35 
8.2.5.  Country-specific recommendations: Vietnam .................................................................................................................... 36 
8.3.  Costs of TP reform and potential impact of increased tax collections in selected countries  ................................................................ 37 
8.3.1.  Interview/research findings for selected countries ............................................................................................................ 37 
8.3.2.  Cost/impact estimations based on publicly available data ................................................................................................ 38 
9.  A general approach to TP reform in developing countries  ............................................................................................................ 39 
10. Concluding remarks on TP and developing countries  ................................................................................................................... 41 
References ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 43 
Appendix A: List of developing countries ................................................................................................................................................... 47 
Appendix B: Country Study Honduras ....................................................................................................................................................... 50 
Appendix C: Country Study Ghana ............................................................................................................................................................ 51 
Appendix D: Country Study Kenya  ............................................................................................................................................................. 52 
Appendix E: Country Study Vietnam .......................................................................................................................................................... 53 
Appendix F: Case Studies  .......................................................................................................................................................................... 54 
Appendix G: Questionnaire ........................................................................................................................................................................ 63 
Appendix H:  Required donor support in selected countries ...................................................................................................................... 66 
Appendix I:   Estimated impact on tax collections resulting from TP reform in selected countries ............................................................ 76 
Appendix J:  Examples from Kenya ........................................................................................................................................................... 89 
Appendix K: Special tax and incentive schemes in selected countries ...................................................................................................... 91 
Appendix L:  List of tax treaties signed by selected countries  .................................................................................................................... 94 
Appendix M: Donor support to date in the selected countries  .................................................................................................................... 98 
Appendix N: Cost-benefit analysis of TP reform in selected countries .................................................................................................... 101 
Appendix O: In a nutshell – challenges/options/support .......................................................................................................................... 106 
 
   Transfer pricing and developing countries 
                                       
III | P a g e  
 
List of figures and tables  
 
Figure 1: Basic preconditions for implementing TP reform ........................................................................................................................ 14 
Figure 2: Overview of the preconditions for TP reform in selected countries  ............................................................................................. 30 
Figure 3: Staged approach to introducing TP reform ................................................................................................................................. 40 
Figure 4: Roadmap to TP reform ............................................................................................................................................................... 42 
 
 
Table 1: GDP growth levels for selected countries .................................................................................................................................... 16 
Table 2: Tax revenues as a share of GDP (%) for selected countries ....................................................................................................... 16 
Table 3: Capital-intensive investments by Sector – Vietnam ..................................................................................................................... 17 
Table 4: Estimated impact/cost from TP reform for selected countries  ...................................................................................................... 38 
 
   Transfer pricing and developing countries 
                                       
IV | P a g e  
 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
AfDB  African Development Bank 
APA  advance pricing agreement 
ATAF  African Tax Administration Forum 
CAIS  Central American Integration System 
CIAT  Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations 
COHPUCP  Colegio Hondureño de Profesionales Universitarios de Contaduría Publica 
CPM  cost plus method 
CUP   comparable uncontrolled price 
DESA  United Nations‟ Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
DR-CAFTA  Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
DTA  double taxation agreements 
EAC  East African Community 
EC  European Commission 
EITI  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
EU  European Union 
FDI  foreign direct investment 
FTA  free trade agreement 
GBP  pound sterling 
GDP  gross domestic product 
GIZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (formerly GTZ) 
GTSP  Global Tax Simplification Program 
GTZ  Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit  
HR  human resources  
IADB  Inter-American Development Bank 
IBFD  International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
IFC  International Finance Corporation 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IT  Information Technology 
ITC  International Tax Compact 
JICA  Japanese International Cooperation Agency Transfer pricing and developing countries 
                                       
V | P a g e  
 
JV  joint venture 
LTO  Large Taxpayer Office 
M&A  mergers and acquisitions 
MAP  mutual agreement procedure 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals 
MNE  multinational enterprise 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OECD Model Convention  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
OECD Guidelines  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax administrations 
PSM  profit split method 
RPM  resale price method 
TIEA  tax information exchange agreement 
TNMM  transactional net margin method 
TP  transfer pricing 
TP Manual  United Nations Transfer Pricing Practical Manual for Developing Countries 
UAE  United Arab Emirates 
UN  United Nations 
UN Expert Committee  Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters 
UN Model Treaty  UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries 
UK  United Kingdom 
USA  United States of America 
VAT  value added tax 
WB  World Bank 
we  PwC 
WTO  World Trade Organisation Transfer pricing and developing countries 
 
1 | P a g e  
 
1.  Executive Summary  
The  Communication  of  the  European  Commission  („EC‟)  on  „Tax  and  Development  –  Cooperating  with  Developing 
Countries in Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters‟ highlighted the need to support developing countries‟ capacity in 
mobilising domestic resources for development in line with the principles of good governance in taxation. It is in this context 
that PwC has been asked to conduct a study on transfer pricing („TP‟) and developing countries. We welcome the initiative 
of the EC as it has the potential to promote a uniform set of TP practices which are adhered to globally. Such development 
would favourably affect the business environment for international trade and activities of multinational enterprises („MNEs‟), 
thereby further contributing to investment and growth in developing countries. 
Generally, TP is high on the agenda because globalisation has lifted the level of cross-border trade between related entities 
to new heights. It is estimated that, worldwide, about 2/3 of all business transactions take place within a group.1 This is 
particularly relevant for developing countries as their economies have recently opened up or are in the process of opening 
up, attracting large amounts of  foreign direct investment („FDI‟) from MNEs. In the absence of TP legislation,2 both tax 
administrations and MNEs have only limited guidance they can refer to when determining TP in related-party transactions. 
However, we find that developing countries encounter particular problems when dealing with TP. Local tax a dministrations 
are often inexperienced with regard to TP and lack basic understanding in the field. For substantiati ng TP, for example 
comparables are difficult to identify because there are fewer  organised companies in any given sector in developing 
countries. In addition, there are no databases which allow information  to be extracted on comparable transactions  or 
companies in order to verify TP between related parties. Further problems exist in gathering taxpayer information due to the 
absence of documentation requirements or the inability to enforce  existing requirements. Equally, tax administrations 
sometimes lack the capacity to process and evaluate such information, partly because of the lack of technical expertise or 
because they do not have the necessary resources at their disposal to process the data. 
Several international organisations work actively on the provision of guidance in the area of TP, and some of them have 
particularly addressed the needs of developing countries.  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(„OECD‟) has made considerable efforts to establish common ground in TP matters based on the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations („OECD Guidelines‟). The United Nations („UN‟) published 
new  working  drafts  of  its  envisaged  United  Nations  Transfer  Pricing  Practical  Manual  for  Developing  Countries  („TP 




                                                             
 
1 WB (2011a), “Transfer Pricing Technical Assistance Global Tax Simplification Program”, Presentation given by Rajul Awasthi in Brussels, 24 February 2011. 
2 For reasons of simplification, we use the term “TP legislation” for any kind of legally binding documents/laws issued by the local tax authorities as regards TP. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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length principle. With respect to international organisations, the importance of platforms for tax administrations must be 
highlighted, as they help foster cooperation and the exchange of best practices, also in the area of TP. 
This report provides an overview on the possibilities for adopting and implementing TP legislation in developing countries 
and identifies possible ways to support developing countries with regard to its enactment. In order to carry out the study, we 
focused on four countries, which were selected by the EC. These countries are Ghana, Honduras, Kenya and Vietnam 
(„selected countries‟) and are all in different stages with regard to TP legislation. While Kenya and Vietnam have some kind 
of specific TP legislation in place, Honduras is about to adopt TP legislation shortly and Ghana currently has no TP-specific 
framework in place. 
In order to provide sound recommendations on further action and assistance with regard to TP reform in the selected 
countries,  we  have  developed  a  generally  applicable  framework of  preconditions  which  should  be  considered before 
pursuing TP reform in developing countries.  More precisely, the necessary preconditions encompass: 
i.  economic and political preconditions (e.g. economic growth and diversification, open economy, FDI); 
ii.  legal preconditions (e.g. comprehensive income tax law, tax treaty network, existing TP legislation if applicable); 
iii.  preconditions related to the tax administration (e.g. some level of specialisation within the tax administration). 
 
We have structured our analysis around  the preconditions selected for the purposes of this study and analysed the 
suitability of the selected countries for TP reform. With regard to existing TP legislation, our research indicates that, despite 
strong affinity to the OECD standards, the scope of existing TP legislation or draft TP legislation is in part significantly 
broader as regards the definition of related parties than is outlined in the OECD Guidelines. From a TP policy perspective, 
and despite the doubtlessly valid reasoning behind such provisions, defining „related parties‟ very broadly may increase the 
administrative burden for both tax administration and taxpayers and thereby hamper investment and growth. 
Our findings indicate that there are significant differences between the selected countries with respect to existence of the 
necessary  preconditions,  which  has  been 
influential  in  our  conclusions  and 
recommendations.  While  the  current  corporate 
income  tax  system  in  the  selected  countries 
would generally justify the initiation of TP reform, 
we feel that only Kenya and Vietnam can draw 
upon a sufficiently large treaty network and tax 
administration  capacities  to  successfully  pursue 
and implement comprehensive TP reform at the 
current  stage.  For  Ghana  and  Honduras,  we 
believe that donor support and assistance should 










preconditionsTransfer pricing and developing countries 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
focus on improving certain preconditions as outlined in this report before the road to comprehensive TP reform is embarked 
upon. 
Based on our field research, we suggest a comprehensive list of possible forms of assistance to the selected countries 
when pursuing or paving the way for TP reform. Based on these findings, we have estimated, based on assumptions, the 
possible costs of introducing TP reform, e.g. setting up a specialist TP team, providing specialist training courses, as well 
as the provision of required materials/facilities (if applicable). Due to the lack of statistical data on the potential benefits of 
introducing TP reform, we have carried out a high-level economic analysis to quantify the potential impact that TP reform 
can have on tax collections from MNEs. Even for our low-impact scenario, we find that the potential increase in tax 
collections should outweigh the anticipated costs of TP reform.  
  Estimated benefit 
(obtained figures) 
Estimated benefit 




(own calculations for 2012, 
low-impact scenario inc. 




Honduras   EUR 301 mn  EUR 4.4 mn  EUR 4.7 mn  EUR 836.357 
Kenya  n/a  EUR 4.3 mn  EUR 4.7 mn  EUR 266.913 
Ghana  n/a  EUR 7.9 mn   EUR 9.1 mn    EUR 964.388 
 
 
Vietnam  n/a  EUR 25.4 mn  EUR 27 mn  EUR 444.126 
 
Based on our findings and additional research we have carried out, we have developed a general framework setting out 
support activities we consider  appropriate depending on the state of play  with respect to  TP in developing countries. 
However, it is generally important to closely assess the country-specific situation and determine the applicable stage for 
each developing country by reference to the catalogue of preconditions for TP reform as outlined in this report. 
i.  Developing countries with no TP legislation in place 
We find that the demand for donor support in developing countries that have no TP legislation (i.e. neither adopted nor 
drafted) is high. Assistance should be provided to establish a fundamental understanding of TP principles, methods and tax 
treaties within the local tax administration. Assistance is also needed with respect to the drafting of TP legislation. In this 
context, it can be particularly helpful to provide tax administrations with examples of existing TP legislation in other 
countries. A selected group of tax officials should be given the possibility of deepening their understanding of TP, e.g. by 
observing TP practices in other countries during secondments.  
 
ii.  Developing countries close to adopting TP legislation 
Developing countries that have already drafted local TP legislation require a different set of measures to support successful 
implementation. As both the tax administration and taxpayers are inexperienced in TP, countries could be assisted in Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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pursuing  a  phased  approach.  For  that  purpose,  local  tax  administrations  could  be  assisted  in  drafting  mandatory 
questionnaires to gather the most-relevant taxpayer information on inter-company transactions or to gradually implement 
documentation requirements. Support will be necessary to ensure that this newly available data is processed efficiently. 
Shortly before/after implementation of the TP legislation, funding could be provided to facilitate and improve communication 
between  taxpayers  and  tax  administrations,  e.g.  to  organise  information  sessions  and  support  facilities.  Given  the 
lengthiness of the negotiations, tax administrations should furthermore be assisted in initiating/conducting negotiations for 
the conclusion of tax treaties. 
 
iii.  Countries that have TP legislation in place 
The group of developing countries with TP legislation needs to be subdivided into those that have TP legislation and those 
that have published TP rules in the form of circulars. We generally recommend that countries should be assisted in 
adopting TP legislation, as this provides taxpayers with greater certainty. In general, for developing countries that already 
have some kind of TP legislation in place, it may be important to offer technical assistance to review and revise the existing 
legislation. Together with this, developing countries can be supported in drafting more-sophisticated TP legislation such as 
advance  pricing  agreements  („APA‟)  and  simplified  compliance  procedures.3  Assistance  is  furthermore  necessary  to 
improve access to data on comparable transactions, e.g. by developing and administering own (regional) databases. The 
development of structured training programmes and the establishment of a physical training infrastructure can equally 
support developing countries at this stage. Also, countries can be assisted in enhancing their existing network of tax 
treaties and responding to new developments regarding trade flows. 
*  *  * 
Both the selected countries and developing countries in general to a large extent require technical assistance to build up TP 
expertise. We emphasise that there is a strong need for long-term assistance and ongoing cooperation on an international 
scale. The donor support initiatives should eventually aim at lifting the TP legislation and its application in developing 
countries to a common international standard. In our opinion, this is vital to reduce economic uncertainty and foster 
investment and growth. It is important to understand that TP reform should not be done under the guise of anti-abuse 
legislation but rather aim at improving the existing rules on corporate income taxation. The majority of taxpayers want to 
comply with local TP requirements in developing countries, and seek guidance on how to apply appropriate remuneration 




                                                             
 
3 This refers to administrative simplification measures, e.g. statutory provisions that apply to a given category of taxpayers and relieve those taxpayers from certain 
obligations otherwise imposed by the tax rules by – usually – substituting simpler obligations (“safe harbours”). See OECD (2010a) TP Guidelines, nos. 4.93 et seq. and 
nos. 4.123 et seq. (APA). Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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2.  Introduction  
It is nowadays commonly acknowledged that taxation is an important factor for economic development and the relationship 
between states and their citizens.4 Additionally, tax revenues are crucial for developing countries 5 in order to build basic 
structures and increase quality of life. However, tax policy choices are influenced by  a country‟s economic structure and 
depend on administrative capacities, which significantly limits the options available to developing countries.6 It is in this 
context that the growing involvement of MNEs in developing countries  has put questions on TP high on the agenda for 
governments and international organisations that seek to promote growth, development and trade. 
As a result of insufficiently sophisticated tax administration structures and processes, many developing countries capture 
only 40% of their tax potential.7 Consequently, developing countries need to establish tax systems that are effective and 
efficient in mobilising revenue. This needs to be combined with minimis ing disincentives to investment and unbalanced 
costs of compliance, which lead to costly misallocations of resources. Developing countries need to ensure that they 
distribute the tax burden equitably. 
In 2000, the world‟s political leaders agreed eight Millennium Development Goals („MDGs‟) to tackle extreme poverty and 
share the benefits of globalisation more equitably.8 In order to meet the goals by 2015, it is generally accepted that the 
initiative‟s success will require helping developing countries strengthen their tax systems and increase domestic revenues. 
Increasing domestic revenue not only creates additional space to support MDG-related spending; it also allows countries to 
assume ownership for their policy. A related EC Communication was adopted in April 2010,9 highlighting the need to 
support developing countries‟ capacity in mobilising domestic resources for development in line with principles of good 
governance in the area of tax. This was supported by the Council in its conclusions of June 2010 and has been supported 
by the European Parliament. 
In order to assist developing countries in the implementation of TP legislation, the EC has proposed to offer support in 
adopting the internationally accepted OECD Guidelines. This would help developing countries in increasing their domestic 
tax  collection  by  processing tax  information better and  ensuring  tax  compliance  for  all  economic actors,  in  line  with 
international standards.  While the importance of TP legislation and enforcement for the collection of tax revenues is 




                                                             
 
4 OECD (2008), “Governance, Taxation and Accountability- issues and practices”, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, www.oecd.org. 
5 For the term “developing countries”, we refer to the classification of the World Bank, see Appendix A. 
6 Bird, R., and Zolt, E., (2003) “Introduction to Tax Policy Design and Development”, Draft prepared for a course on Practical Issues of Tax Policy in Developing Countries, 
World Bank, 28 April-1 May 2003. 
7 International Tax Compact (2011), “Benefits of a computerized integrated system for taxation”, iTax case study, Bonn, February 2011. 
8 UN (2000), Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 55/2 United Nations Millennium Declaration, 8th plenary meeting, 8 September 2000. 
9 EC (2010), COM (2010) 163 final, “Tax and Development – Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters”, 21 April 2010. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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3.  About this report 
This study was commissioned by the European Commission within the framework of its Tax and Development 
Agenda and with the financial support of the European Parliament. It is in this context that PwC („we‟) have been 
asked to conduct research on TP and developing countries. We feel that the rationale behind the study, i.e. the analysis of 
possible ways to support developing countries in enacting TP legislation, is vital from both a development and a business 
perspective.  Several  developing  countries  are  planning  to  introduce  TP  legislation  to capture additional  income from 
international related-party transactions. If countries decide to introduce such legislation on their own, there is a danger that 
this will lead to the emergence of a large diversity in TP legislation in various countries across the globe. The study has the 
potential to promote a uniform set of TP rules that are adhered to globally. We are of the opinion that such development 
would  favourably  affect  the  environment  for  international  trade  and  MNE  activities,  thereby  further  contributing  to 
investment and growth in developing countries. It is for this reason that PwC decided to participate in this study and assist 
in verifying whether a common denominator is available in the field TP. 
 
The main purpose of this report is to provide an overview on the possibilities for adopting and implementing TP legislation 
in developing countries and to identify possible ways to support developing countries in this respect. To perform the 
analysis, four developing countries  in Asia (Vietnam), Africa (Kenya and Ghana) and the Americas (Honduras) were 
selected by the EC. While Kenya and Vietnam have some kind of specific TP legislation in place, Honduras is about to 
adopt TP legislation shortly and Ghana currently has no TP-specific framework in place.10 
In order to carry out the analysis, we addressed the following issues: 
  Why is TP important and what are the problems developing countries face with regard to TP? 
  What international guidance exists for developing countries with respect to TP? 
  What is the economic situation and general tax environment in the selected countries? 
  What policies do selected countries currently pursue in the area of TP and what are the legal foundations?  
  What experiences do the selected countries have with respect to tax reform processes?  
  What likely impact of increasing tax collections and costs can the selected countries expect from TP reform?  
  What kind of assistance have the selected countries already received in the area of TP and what would be the 




                                                             
 
10 It should be noted, however, that the arm‟s length principle is enshrined in Ghana‟s anti-avoidance legislation. Although the local tax administration already possesses 
some experience with regard to the arm‟s length principle, its application has been limited to an anti-avoidance context and hence is not regarded as formal TP legislation 
for the purpose of this study.  Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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  What conclusions and recommendations can be drawn from the example of the selected countries with regard 
to TP and developing countries in general? 
Methodology  
A detailed work plan, including the different steps of this project, was agreed with the EC in October 2010 and was followed 
by launch of the study in January 2011. As indicated above, it was agreed to focus on four developing countries, which 
were selected to serve as illustrative examples for the different stages of TP reform. This report offers an overview on the 
findings of these individual country studies11 and the additional research we have undertaken to gain an  understanding of 
the tax environment, state of play with regard to TP legislation and audit practices, as well as reform capacities in the 
selected countries. This additional research also covered other developing countries such as China and India, for which we 
have prepared case studies. We have furthermore integrated a case study on the United States  of America („USA‟) to 
illustrate the timeline and development of TP reform over a longer period of time.12 
 
We conducted local interviews with revenue authorities, donor organisations, civil society organisations, academics and 
business representatives from different industries, e.g. the automotive and pharmaceutical sector, during  February to April 
2011. To prepare for these interviews, we developed a standardised questionnaire addressing the topics mentioned above. 
This questionnaire was amended according to local circumstances and additional country -specific questions were raised 
based on these initial queries.13 The interview partners were selected based on their functions in the revenue authorities or 
their experience/knowledge of the local tax and business environment. Based on our field interviews and our TP experience 
in the selected countries, we furthermore collected data on the assistance required by local tax administrations with regard 
to TP reform. These tables, which offer a comprehensive overview o f our recommendations, provide an indication with 
regard to the estimated costs of introducing and implementing TP legislation in the selected countries.14  
 
To provide an estimate o f  the budgetary impact of MNE activity and the possible increase of corporate income tax 
collections by introducing TP legislation, we have prepared calculations to quantify the potential impact of increasing tax 
collections by TP reform in the selected cou ntries. For this purpose, we have  taken  publicly available sources of 
quantitative data and referenced these sources accordingly. We did not fact or in the possible impact of increas ed tax 
collection on the local investment climate.  Furthermore, our estimations of increased tax collections do not take into 
account possible additional revenues from other sources than corporate income tax, such as customs revenues. It should, 




                                                             
 
11 For the individual country studies, see Appendices B–E. 
12 For the individual case studies, see Appendix F. 
13  For the questionnaire, see Appendix G.  Please refer to the individual country studies for information regarding the interview partners. For reasons of confidentiality, the 
information on interview partners could not be stated publicly in some cases. 
14 For the tables on required donor support, see Appendix H. 
15 For the estimated impact on tax collections, see Appendix I. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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The draft study has been discussed with a group of stakeholders on 3 May 2011; the final study was presented to a larger 
group of stakeholders and representatives of the local revenue authorities from Ghana, Honduras and Vietnam on 5 July 
2011. Based on our discussions and the comments we have received subsequently (inter alia, from the OECD and UN), we 
have incorporated further aspects into it. We would stress that, given the restraints regarding time and budget, our report‟s 
findings only give an outline of TP in the broader context of developing countries. Nevertheless, we believe that the four 
selected countries represent a suitable core group because they are at different stages of drafting, adopting or enforcing TP 
legislation in their respective jurisdictions. Hence, even though a broad statement on TP and developing countries based on 
this report might be inappropriate, the findings do provide a strong basis to assess the challenges faced by developing 
countries and distil recommendations regarding future action and donor support in the area of TP. 
 
4.  The importance and pitfalls of TP  
Globalisation and economic growth have driven the level of inter-company transactions to new heights. It is estimated that 
more than 2/3 of all business transactions worldwide take place within groups, a figure that is likely to grow further in the 
future.16 In particular, developing countries are observing immense growth  in intra-group transactions due to the fact that 
their economies are still in the process of opening up and attract large amounts of FDI. 
Therefore, TP is not only of importance to business but also for tax administrations, which have to implement or adapt their 
national TP legislation and practices accordingly. International consistency in TP is beneficial to creating a basic structure 
of taxable persons and events, which ensures proper application of the arm‟s length principle. The UN has stressed that “... 
consistency is an important goal to be aimed at in terms of encouraging investment in a country and international trade that 
assists a country’s development, although it is ultimately for each country to adopt an approach that works in its domestic 
legal and administrative framework, and is consistent with its treaty obligations”.17 However, application of the arm‟s length 
principle18 to the domestic realities of developing countries generates several questions. Not  just the high level of MNEs‟ 
integration and their ever-evolving business models, but also the increase in intra-group trades in intangibles/services as 




                                                             
 
16 WB (2011a), “Transfer Pricing Technical Assistance Global Tax Simplification Program”, Presentation given by Rajul Awasthi in Brussels, 24 February 2011.  
17UN  (2011),  “Transfer  Pricing  Practical  Manual  for  Developing  Countries”  (TP  Manual),  Working  Draft  Chapter  I,  n°  8.4,  http://www.un.org/esa/ 
ffd/tax/documents/bgrd_tp.htm. 
18 The arm‟s length principle represents the international standard that OECD member countries have agreed should be used for determining transfer prices for tax 
purposes. It is set forth in article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention as follows: where “conditions are made or imposed between two enterprises in their commercial 
or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have 
accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxes accordingly.” See 
OECD (2010a), “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations” (OECD Guidelines), 22 July 2010. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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Developing  countries  often  lack  the  necessary  legal  framework  to  enforce  TP  and  sanction  non-compliance  and 
misconduct. This often includes the fact that local financial accounting provisions, which usually form the basis for tax 
accounting, are not sufficiently comprehensive.  Furthermore, it is widely accepted that applying TP requires skill and 
judgment  by  both  taxpayers  and  tax  authorities.  Especially  regarding  TP  expertise,  developing  countries  often  face 
difficulties due to information „gaps‟. Local tax administrations may fail to collect necessary information due to the absence 
of documentation requirements, be unable to enforce such requirements or lack the capacity to process and evaluate such 
information. Additionally, there is the problem of human resource „gaps‟, meaning that the few TP or large-taxpayer experts 
that there are within tax administrations may leave the organisation because of changes in governing structures or more 
competitive employment opportunities in the business environment. 
The arm‟s length principle is furthermore becoming increasingly difficult and complex to administer as TP audits need to be 
performed  on  a  case-by-case  basis  and  are  often  costly  tasks  for  both  tax  authorities  and  taxpayers.19  One of the 
foundations of the arm‟s length principle is comparative pricing; however, proper comparability is often difficult to find in 
developing countries. The fact is that the traditional TP methods20 rely directly on comparables, which have to be similar to 
those of the tested party. It is often extremely difficult, especially in developing countries, to obtain adequate information on 
comparables, for the following reasons:21 
  There tend to be fewer organised companies in any given sector than in developed countries. 
  Existing databases for TP analysis focus on data from developed countries. This data may not be comparable or 
useful  in  performing  benchmarking  studies  for  companies  operating  in  developing  countries  (at  least  without 
resource and information-intensive adjustments) and, in any event, are usually costly to access. 
  The economies of developing countries may just have opened up or be in the process of opening up. There are 
many „first movers‟ who have come into existence in many sectors and areas hitherto unexploited or unexplored; in 
such cases, there is an inevitable lack of comparables. 
 
In some cases, the problem of being unable to determine and justify the adequacy of related-party transactions is faced not 
only by tax administrations but also by taxpayers.22 This often results in increasingly difficult tax audits. It is difficult to set 
down an exhaustive list of the c ommon reasons for TP adjustments in tax audits in both developed and developing 
countries. However, these grounds usually include the deemed non -arm‟s length nature of inter-company transactions,23 




                                                             
 
19 See UN (2011), op cit., no. 10.9. 
20 Comparable uncontrolled price method, resale price method, cost plus method; see OECD (2010a), TP Guidelines, Chapter II and section 5.1. 
21 See UN (2011), “Transfer pricing: practical manual for developing countries”, Working Draft, no. 10.6, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/documents/bgrd_tp.htm. 
22  The difficulties of comparability in TP have also been recognised by the OECD in the past,  see  “Invitation  to  comment  on  comparability”,  May  2006, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/38/36651642.pdf. 
23 Norwegian Government Commission on capital flight from developing countries (2008), “Tax havens and development” (preliminary report), submitted 18 June 2009, 
see http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/tax_report.pdf. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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transfer of property; and business restructurings are also implicated. Although the difference in the corporate income tax 
rate between the different parties in a transaction should not impact the arm‟s length nature of the dealings, it is often used 
by  revenue  authorities  as  a  trigger  for  further  scrutiny.  In  addition,  some  tax  authorities,  e.g.  the  Kenyan  Revenue 
Authorities,24 make use of non-publicly available information for validating TP, to the disadvantage of bona fide taxpayers 
that do not have access to such data and hence are not able to verify such comparisons. This generates legal and 
economic uncertainty for taxpayers, which potentially precludes commitments with respect to investment decisions and 
business development. 
 
In cases of dispute between revenue authorities of two countries on an appropriate arm‟s length remuneration, mutual 
agreement procedures („MAPs‟) are commonly used to avoid taxation of the same profits in two jurisdictions. However, 
these MAPs are usually based on bilateral double taxation agreements („DTAs‟) and can likewise be time-consuming and 
technical in their nature. Resources, monetary and otherwise, may be limited not only for the tax administration but also for 
the taxpayer (especially for small and medium-sized enterprises), which may be subject to detailed TP documentation 
requirements. Taxpayers might not have the possibility to consult upfront with the tax administration to achieve compliance, 
which represents a problem in the absence of case law. 
In addition, developing countries are also under pressure from developed countries where the counterparties of local 
companies involved in related-party transactions are subject to taxation. Developing countries are expected to improve TP 
enforcement and enhance the level of transparency with regard to related-party transactions. This also requires a robust 
information exchange mechanism between countries, which should be based on solid legal grounds and comply with 
international standards. Developing countries still lag behind in DTAs containing a clause on the exchange of information or 
specific tax information exchange agreements („TIEAs‟), which represent a relatively new tool to improve cooperation 
between tax authorities in TP matters. Generally, bilateral or multilateral exchange of information with developing countries 
is nonetheless negatively impacted by the information „gaps‟ outlined above. 
5.  Activities by international organisations 
in the field of TP  
5.1.  The OECD Guidelines 
The OECD has made considerable efforts in offering an international standard for levelling the playing field in the area of 




                                                             
 
24  Wright,  T.N.,  (2010)  “Kenyan  Practitioner  decries  government‟s  aggressive  tactics  in  transfer  pricing  audits”,  Tax  Management  Transfer  Pricing  Report  920, 
International Tax Centre, 13 January 2011. This refers to comparables derived from tax files and financial statements only available to the tax authorities. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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agreed common methods and practices in the area of TP, which are outlined in the OECD Guidelines.25 In particular, the 
OECD Guidelines outline five methods to determine the arm‟s length nature of transfer prices: 
1. Comparable  uncontrolled  price  (CUP)  method;  which  is  based  on  the  comparison  of  prices  charged  in  a 
controlled  transaction  to  the  price  charged  in  an  uncontrolled  transaction  in  comparable  circumstances  for 
comparable products and services. 
2. Resale price method (RPM); which is based on the resale price at which a product purchased from a related party 
is sold to an independent enterprise. The transfer price of the inter-company transaction is calculated by deducting 
the resale price margin from the resale price in the uncontrolled transaction. 
3. Cost plus method (CPM);  which uses the costs incurred by the supplier of property/services in a controlled 
transaction. A mark-up taking into consideration the functions performed, risks assumed and assets employed is 
added to the costs to determine the arm‟s length price in the controlled transaction. 
4. Transactional net margin method (TNMM); which examines the net profit margin relative to an appropriate base 
(e.g. cost, sales, assets) realised from a controlled transaction. 
5. Profit split method (PSM); which is based on identification and appropriate split of the profit realised by related 
entities from a controlled transaction.26  
Due to the sophistication of the guidance and the economic importance of the participating countries, the OECD Guidelines 
have the potential to serve as a universally recognised approach to TP. Furthermore, the OECD has a Global Relations 
programme, which promotes global dialogue on TP and aims at promoting good practice, building country transfer pricing  
capacity and feeding non-OECD country views into the OECD‟s work in this area. 
From an economic perspective, the establishment of global standards and methods in the area of TP should be clearly 
advocated. Overall, double taxation is detrimental to economic development and is more likely to occur if there are 
mismatches in country approaches to TP. Harmonisation of TP helps to facilitate bilateral and multilateral cooperation (e.g. 
in the area of exchange of information) and reduces the risk of double taxation through the promotion of advance pricing 
agreements („APAs‟) and MAPs. It also provides MNEs with more certainty for estimating what kind of consequences their 
activities and transactions trigger in terms of local taxation. International adherence to the OECD Guidelines may help 
foster development through investment. 
In  this  context,  the  OECD  is  actively  advocating  the  development  of  a  functional,  efficient tax system  in developing 




                                                             
 
25  Developing countries which are currently members of the OECD include Chile, Mexico and Turkey. The OECD also closely works with developing countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. The OECD‟s approaches to TP are adhered to by the OECD member states and in principle do not bind states that are not directly affiliated to 
the organisation. 
26 For the comprehensive provisions on the different methods, please refer to the OECD Guidelines. For the CUP method, Chapter II, nos. 2.13 et seq.; for the RPM, nos. 
2.21 et seq.; for the CPM, nos. 2.39 et seq.; for the TNMM, nos. 2.58 et seq.; and for the PSM, nos. 2.108 et seq. 
27  OECD (2010b), Co-Chairs‟ Statement of Joint Meeting on Tax and Development between the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) and the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), 27 January 2010. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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OECD aims to help developing countries in gathering the necessary data to analyse how their local tax administrations 
collect tax revenues and how good governance can be further strengthened. The OECD has published additional guidance 
with respect to the relation between governance and taxation,28 which stresses the role of the taxation system in  national 
development. Furthermore, the OECD has developed draft TP legislation for developing economies, 29 which is based on 
the international standards promoted through the OECD Guidelines. 
The OECD is establishing a Global Forum on Transfer Pricing, which will meet for the first time in 2012. It is envisaged that 
this Forum will be designed to provide a place for government officials from OECD and non-OECD countries to share their 
expertise and exchange their views on theoretical and administrative aspects of TP.  The OECD has also developed 
informal explanatory notes on a number of aspects of TP (the first five of these deal with TP methods, comparability, 
comparability adjustments, arm‟s length range and location savings (not yet finalised)).  
5.2.  The UN TP Manual 
The United Nations („UN‟) has produced the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries („UN Model Treaty‟) in order to provide developing countries with a foundation when negotiating and 
signing DTAs with developed countries. In addition, the work of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(„DESA‟) pursues the objective of assisting countries in their economic, social and environmental development. Within the 
DESA, the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters („UN Expert Committee‟) has been dedicated 
to working specifically on issues arising for developing countries with regard to TP and international cooperation. 
In 2009, the UN Expert Committee initiated its work on the UN Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries („TP 
Manual‟) and published new working drafts on 31 May 2011.30 The TP Manual is designed to respond to the specific needs 
of developing countries and offers  a step-by-step approach to adopting and implementing TP legislation in developing 
countries. The different sections of the guide deal with the basic questions regarding TP, and provide information on how to 
draft TP legislation and set up special TP units, how to identify and work with TP databases, how to pursue simplified 
strategies for verifying the arm‟s length nature of a related-party transaction plus compliance strategies for different sized 
companies. In its draft, the UN Expert Committee establishes a clear reference to existing guidelines and endorses the 
various elements of the principles stated in the OECD Guidelines (e.g. the arm‟s length principle). 
Conceptually, the TP Manual emphasises that TP as such is not necessarily abusive and should not therefore be regarded 




                                                             
 
28  OECD  (2008),  Governance,  Taxation  and  Accountability;  OECD  (2010c),  “Citizen-State  Relations:  Improving  Governance  Through  Tax  Reform”,  Citizen-State 
Relations, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/60/46008596.pdf. 
29  OECD  (2010d),  “Transfer  Pricing  Legislation  –  A  suggested  approach”,  Centre  for  Tax  Policy  and  Administration,  November  2010, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/6/45765682.pdf.  
30 The working draft chapters, together with a note by the secretariat are publicly available on the UN website, see UN (2011), op. cit. 
31 UN (2011), op. cit, Draft Working Chapter I, no. 1.7. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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introduced in conjunction with anti-avoidance regulations and therefore runs the risk of being generally regarded as a tool to 
circumvent taxation. 
5.3. The work of other international organisations   
In addition to the OECD and the UN, other international organisations have recognised the need to support developing 
countries in building capacity in taxation matters. The International Monetary Fund („IMF‟) has committed to financing local 
projects in low-income countries to progress towards the MDGs. In that context, the IMF has provided advice and technical 
assistance to countries but also granted significant amounts of funding and helped mobilise donor support. 
The World Bank („WB‟) has also confirmed the need to support developing countries in adopting tax governance and TP 
legislation. For that purpose, the WB has initiated a Global Tax Simplification Programme („GTSP‟) to improve the efficiency 
and simplicity of tax administration and processes, an area identified as one of the top-three major constraints that business 
faces in today‟s economic environment. On that basis, the GTSP provides technical assistance on setting up/improving TP 
legislation and including TP risk criteria in designing risk-based assessments for tax audits. 
It is important to mention that capacity-building is also fostered by regional tax forums such as the Inter-American Centre of 
Tax Administrations („CIAT‟) and the African Tax Administration Forum („ATAF‟). These platforms for mutual cooperation 
are used by tax administrations to share views on tax matters and best practices, and can make a substantial contribution 
towards levelling the playing field in the area of TP. As examples, Ecuador and Uruguay have introduced specific methods 
to evaluate the exportation of commodities based on experience shared by the Argentinean tax authorities. The ATAF, 
currently  composed  of  30  African  member  countries,  was  created  as  a  programme  addressing  African  needs  and 
strategies. It seeks to encourage partnerships between African countries and receives support from donor partners like the 
African Development Bank („AfDB‟) and the OECD. In the recent past, several seminars and training sessions organised by 
the ATAF have dealt with the subject of TP. 
6.  Preconditions for TP reform 
 
As developing countries open up their economies, the need arises to establish a sound corporate income taxation system,32 
which is the foundation for TP legislation. To an even greater degree, certain pr econditions and basic requirements with 





                                                             
 
32  See  Tanzi,  V.,  and  Zee,  H.,  (2001)  „Tax  Policy  for  Developing  Countries‟,  International  Monetary  Fund,  Economic  Issues  no.  27,  March  2001, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues27/index.htm; and Bird, Richard M., and Zolt, Eric M., (2003) op cit. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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It is important to stress that TP only represents one of a number of different legislative and administrative measures that 
have an impact on related-party transactions. These measures include thin capitalisation rules,33 money exchange controls 
and general anti-abuse legislation. Indeed, the existence of a general anti-abuse framework is often observed in countries 
that do not yet have comprehensive TP legislation in place (e.g. Ghana). However, in-depth analysis of these measures is 
not within the scope of this report. 
 
The preconditions for TP reform can be divided into three main categories, which form the pillars of TP reform. These 
include the economic and legal preconditions, as well as the preconditions with regard to the organisation and capacities of 
the national tax administration (see Figure 1). The aptitude of developing countries for TP reform should be assessed in line 
with these items. 
Figure 1: Basic preconditions for implementing TP reform  
1. Economic and political preconditions 
  political stability 
  economic growth and diversification (*)  
  open economy allowing significant export/import activity (*) 
  large FDI and involvement of MNEs (current /outlook) (*) 
  infrastructure (transport/ communication), skilled workforce/educational system 
2. Legal preconditions 
  comprehensive accounting rules 
  comprehensive income tax law (*) 
  understanding of administrative simplification measures 
  adherence to the internationally accepted OECD taxation principles (neutrality, efficiency, certainty and simplicity, 
effectiveness and fairness, flexibility) 
  legal system providing for cross-border flows of capital and assets 
  tax treaty network (*) 
  legal infrastructure: courts system, appeal procedures  
  existing TP legislation (if applicable) (*) 
3. Tax administration 
  trained staff (*) 
  competitive salary packages 
  training facilities (*) 
  language abilities (*) 
  taxpayer education/assistance channels (*) 
  effective processes of tax return filing and data processing 




                                                             
 
33 Appendix J, Box 1 provides an illustrative example of the thin-capitalisation rules that apply in Kenya. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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  monitoring of tax revenues 
  effective tax procedures (administrative/ judiciary) 
  tools for exchange of information within the tax administration 
  information technology 
  some level of specialisation within tax administration (*) 
  internal controls 
  experience with tax reform 
  experience with TP enforcement and audits (if applicable) (*) 
  bilateral/multilateral cooperation with other tax administrations 
(*) Preconditions selected for further analysis in this study. 
 
 
7.  Selected countries and TP reform 
7.1.  Introductory remarks 
The most important results of our study on TP in developing countries are outlined in this section. Please note that this 
section only gives a comparative overview and summarises our findings. For the full country studies that we have carried 
out, we refer to the more-detailed appendices, which are attached to this report. 
In order to discuss the possibilities available to the selected countries with regard to TP reform, we structure our analysis 
along the lines of the clusters of preconditions for TP identified in the previous section, i.e. the economic and political 
preconditions, legal preconditions and capacities of local tax administrations. Our assessment will be impacted by the fact 
that a number of these preconditions are interrelated or out of the scope of this report. However, at the end of our analysis, 
we provide an opinion on the state of play in the selected countries and assess whether they can be regarded as suitable 
candidates for donor support for TP reform. Throughout the report, we integrate information on TP and other developing 
countries whenever feasible to provide a broader picture on TP in developing countries. 
7.2.  Economic and political preconditions  
7.2.1.  GDP growth, economic sectors and financial markets 
The developing countries selected for the purpose of this study have shown overall steep growth levels in terms of their 
GDP over the past few years (see Table 1), however they have been affected by the global economic downturn or national 
crises (e.g. Kenya‟s post-election crisis in 2007-2008). Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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Table 1: GDP growth levels for selected countries34  
Country  2006  2007  2008  2009  4-yr average 
Ghana  4.6%  6.5%  8.4%  4.7%  6.1% 
Honduras  6.7%  6.2%  4.1%  -2.1%  3.8% 
Kenya  6.3%  7.0%  1.6%  2.6%  4.4% 
Vietnam  8.2%  8.5%  6.3%  5.3%  7.1% 
 
The tax to GDP ratio (see Table 2) in the selected countries has been subject to slight fluctuations over recent years but still 
remains low compared to the OECD average (34%–35%).35 This was one of the reasons why this study was launched with 
a view to investigating how to increase the tax to GDP ratio in developing countries. 
Table 2: Tax revenues as a share of GDP (%) for selected countries36   
Country  2005  2006  2007  2008  4-yr average 
Ghana  23.8%  22.9%  20.5%  21.3%  22.1% 
Honduras  15.9%  16.3%  15.2%  14.5%  15.5% 
Kenya  18.9%  17.9%  17.4%  18.7%   18.2% 
Vietnam  26.2%     27.1%  26.2%        26.4%                   26.5% 
 
Historically, the selected countries have produced agricultural products, raw materials and minerals. In fact, agriculture still 
contributes to a significant share of GDP and export earnings in many areas.37 It represents one of the five biggest industry 
sectors in Kenya, together with the wholesale, trade, transport, communications, manufacturing and education industries. 
Equally, in Ghana, agriculture represents a large proportion of national industry (30.2 % of GDP), together with industry 
(18.6%) and  services (51.1%). During the  past few years, substantial oil and gas deposits  have been found on the 
Ghanaian coast and are likely to significantly change the economic structure of th at West African country. Overall, both 
Kenya and Ghana suffer from a large shadow economy.38  
Agriculture also makes a large contribution to the economy of Honduras, and the country has historically depend ed on the 




                                                             
 
34  Annual  percentage  growth  rate  of  GDP  at  market  prices  based  on  constant  local  currency,  see  IMF  (2011),  World  Economic  Outlook  database  April  2011, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx.  
35 OECD (2010), Revenue Statistics 2010 – Special feature: Environmental Related Taxation, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/rev_stats-2010-en-fr. 
36 WB (2011b), “The World Bank Open Data Catalogue”, Tax Revenue (% of GDP), www.data.worldbank.org. 
37 As an example, the agricultural sector in Kenya averaged about 23% of the country‟s GDP between 2006 and 2009 and contributed to more than 60% of export 
earnings; see Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2010), Economic Survey 2010, http://www.knbs.or.ke. 
38 Estimates on the contribution of informal enterprises (i.e. the informal sector) to non -agricultural GDP is significant for both Kenya (25% in 1999) and Ghana (58% in 
1988); see International Labour Organisation (2002), “Women and men in the informal economy – a statistical picture”, Employment Sector, Geneva. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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largely diversified due to high levels of international trading in agricultural commodities and manufacturing, making the 
country the most open economy in Central America.39  
In Vietnam, the agricultural sector, including forestry and fishing, contributed to about 21% of GDP in 2009. This marks a 
decrease compared to 2000, when nearly 25% of the national economy  was made up of agriculture, forestry and fishing, 
and is accompanied by an increase in industry and construction activities (from 37% in 2000 to 40% in 2009).  Capital 
intensive investments in Vietnam are mainly observed in the manufacturing sector (49%), followed by the property (25%), 
construction and hotel/restaurant sectors (all 6%, see Table 3). 
Table 3: Capital-intensive investments by Sector – Vietnam40 
Sector  No. of projects  Registered capital in USD mn 
(in EUR mn) 
Manufacturing  7,418  96,253.92 (68,576.46) 
Property  353  48,209.85 (34,347.29) 
Construction  705  11,634.35 (8,288.94)  
Hotel and Restaurant  300  11,364.71 (8,096.83) 
Electricity, gas, water production and distribution  63  4,870.37 (3,469.91) 
IT  645  4,791.11 (3,413.44) 
Art and Entertainment  125  3,461.36 (2,466.06) 
Logistics  301  3,183.01 (2,267.75) 
Agriculture, Forestry and Aquaculture  482  3,096.12 (2,205.84) 
Mining  69  2,959.85 (2,108.76) 
Wholesale and Retail  496  1,669.24 (1,189.26) 
Finance, Banking and Insurance  73  1,321.48 (941.49) 
Others  1,418  3,135.98 (2,234.24) 
In line with economic growth, financial markets, financial services and insurance services in the selected countries have 
seen a considerable increase, triggering various reforms  that have been carried out to improve the efficiency of the 
commercial banking system. For example, Vietnam restructured financial institutions and transformed state-owned banks 
into independent businesses starting in 1998. A number of additional changes in policies and regulations were announced 
in 2010 and aim to further modernise the sector by, inter alia, revising banking laws and introducing higher minimum capital 




                                                             
 
39  WB  (2011),  “Honduras  Country  brief”,  http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/HONDURASEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21035522~ 
pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295071,00.html. 
40 As of 22 February 2011; Vietnam Investment Review (2011), “Investment Update”, 28 March – 3 April 2011. We did not obtain similarly detailed data for the other 
selected countries. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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making the issuance of licences to run such businesses and offer such services subject to a suitability process and 
constant monitoring once a licence is granted. 
7.2.2.  Trade liberalisation and international business relationships 
In recent years, economic reforms and trade liberalisation have been driven forward in almost all developing countries to 
restructure economies, increase wealth and attract investment. In Vietnam, this tendency has resulted in a variety of 
different economic reforms, which have been implemented since 1986 under the „Renovation‟ policy and aimed at building 
a multi-sector economy, whereby the focus lies on economic management and financial, monetary and administrative 
reforms. Since 1996, growing investments have been made in producing goods for export, infrastructure construction, 
producing import substitutes and in labour-intensive industries. 
This tendency of opening up local economies has been further reinforced because some countries have actively pursued 
policies to increase cross-border trade by entering into FTAs or joining international trade organisations such as the WTO. 
For instance, in Honduras, trade liberalisation through  a total of nine FTAs has facilitated the establishment of new 
industries such as pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and textile manufacturing, which increasingly make significant 
contributions to the GDP. 
Honduras has furthermore signed a treaty creating a regional trading scheme, serving as a basis for regional trade 
agreements (Central American Integration System, „CAIS‟). Additionally, the country, together with other Central American 
States,  has  entered  into  multilateral  FTA  negotiations  with  strong  trading  nations/regions  such  as  Canada  and  the 
European Union. The most important FTA Honduras has entered into is the DR-CAFTA,41 which was signed among the 
central American states, the Dominican Republic and the United States. The agreement has eliminated tariffs and reduced 
barriers to the provision of services. The practice of increasing trade cooperation has also been observed in the case of 
developing countries in the region of South Asia, where a number of emerging economies, e.g. Vietnam, have become 
members of the Association of South East Asian Nations („ASEAN‟) and signed a number of bilateral FTAs. Negotiations for 
an EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement commenced in May 2007. 
Ghana mainly has trade relationships with Nigeria, China, the US, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ivory Coast, 
France and India. Relatively weak regional trade integration in Africa, as a result of which more than 80% of Africa‟s total 
exports go to Europe, Asia and America,42 also becomes apparent when looking at the trade relationships of Kenya. Its 




                                                             
 
41 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement. 
42 Economic Commission for Africa (2010), “New Report on Assessing Regional Integration in Africa Features Intra-African Trade at the ADB Annual Meetings”, Press 
Release No. 43/2010, http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/press_releases/2010_pressreleases/pressrelease4310.html.  Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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with four other African countries, Kenya has established the East African Community („EAC‟),43 which launched its own 
common market in 2010 and seeks, inter alia, to boost intra-African trade. 
7.2.3.  FDI and the importance of MNEs in local economies  
The assessment of MNE activity in the selected countries is an important step in the analysis for the need for TP reform. It 
not only allows conclusions to be drawn with regard to the relevance of TP and, hence, the potential impact on tax 
collections of investing in TP reform, it also highlights specific economic sectors that should potentially receive special 
attention  when  TP  legislation  is  drafted.  Certain  sectors  involve  very  specific  business  transactions  of  increasing 
complexity, such as the frequent transfer of intangible assets or finance transactions. 
 
Overall, MNEs play a significant role in the economies of the selected countries. In Honduras, it is estimated that they 
represent approximately 24% of total GDP. In Kenya, it is estimated that MNEs account for a significant percentage of the 
large taxpayer population, which contributes to about 75% of total tax revenues.44 Many MNEs in Kenya  began their 
operations in the early  1990s, but a significant share of  them already  started to invest when  the  country  attained 
independence (1963). In some industry sectors, especially agriculture, manufacturing, transport and financing,  a strong 
MNE presence can be observed. Even though MNEs have traditionally operated as fully-fledged entrepreneurs in Kenya, 
some have recently opted to lower the risk profile of their local entities by transferring functions and value -addition 
processes out of Kenya. This is due to activities such as manufacturing  being centralised in other countries like Egypt, 
South Africa and the United Arab Emirates („UAE‟). 
MNEs‟ activities and investments often target specific industries. In Ghana, in the past five years, MNEs have increasingly 
invested  and  are  now  mainly  active  in  the  sectors  of  transport  and  communication  (49%  of  GDP),  banking  (18%), 
mining/quarrying  (15%)  and  real  estate  (6%).  Additional  sectors  of  MNE  importance  include  insurance,  construction, 
manufacturing, distribution and oil/gas/petroleum. Most MNEs have 100% foreign-owned investments; however, those in 
the mining industry are not usually 100% owned, since the laws of Ghana require a minimum holding by the government. 
Related-party transactions include trade in tangible goods and intra-group financing, but MNEs also provide or receive 
management and technical services, know-how, patents and other property rights. In 2009, MNE contributed about 21.13% 




                                                             
 
43 The members of the EAC are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, see http://www.eac.int/. 
44 Both direct and indirect taxation. Receipts from corporate income tax contribute 19% of total tax revenue (average 2005–2010) (estimates obtained from the Treasury 
Department of the Kenyan Ministry of Finance). 
45 Information obtained from the Larger Taxpayer Unit of the Ghanaian Revenue Authorities. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain figures on MNE contributions to 
GDP for all the selected countries. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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In Vietnam, MNEs were observed to be increasingly active in the country following introduction of the Law on Foreign 
Investment in 1987. They have invested in a variety of different industries, ranging from manufacturing to water supply and 
waste management.  
7.3.  Legal preconditions  
7.3.1.  Corporate income taxation and special tax regimes 
Most developing countries have implemented a tax on corporate profits and require taxpayers to calculate their tax base for 
corporate income taxation purposes. The countries selected for the study, Ghana (25%), Honduras (25%), Kenya (30%) 
and Vietnam (25%), all levy income tax on business profits (standard rates). In fact, many developing countries use multiple 
rates, which mostly apply to specific economic sectors, and also exclude some sectors  completely from taxation (tax 
breaks). Some have noted that these special schemes are detrimental to the functioning of market forces in developing 
economies.46  
Overall, the taxation systems have undergone considerable changes during the last few years, but it is not possible to 
identify a common pattern for the selected countries. For example, Vietnam lowered its corporate income tax rates from 
32% in 200347 to 25% in 2009  in a conscious effort to reduce the level of company taxation. In contrast, Honduras 
comprehensively overhauled its tax system in 2010, inter alia by expanding the tax base and eliminating a large number of 
tax exemptions. 
In order to encourage FDI, some developing countries have introduced tax incentives and special tax regimes, including 
temporary import regimes.48 The ultimate intent behind these schemes is often to increase employment and the average 
skill levels of the local labour force.  The existence of tax incentive schemes influences considerations on TP reform 
because, while partially successful in attracting investment, they lead to a fragmentation of the income tax regime. In 
particular, this can influence the effects of different pricing policies between related companies, even in a domestic context, 




                                                             
 
46 Tanzi, V., and Zee, H., (2000) “Tax Policy in Emerging Markets: Developing Countries”, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/35. 
47 25% for foreign-invested companies and foreign parties to business cooperation contracts. 
48 A very prominent example of this is Mexico, where, due to an in-bound programme set up in 1965 (commonly referred to as the “Maquila programme”), a large amount 
of FDI in manufacturing activities was attracted to the country. Tax incentives were given by way of an exemption from general income tax and VAT. See Mexican Bank 
for  Foreign  Trade  (Bancomecxt)  (2002),  “Basic  Guide  for  Foreign  Investors  2002/2003”,  4th  edition,  Mexico,  http://portal.sre.gob.mx/singapur/ 
pdf/BasicGuideForForeignInvestors.pdf. For an overview of existing tax incentive schemes in the selected countries, see Appendix K. 
49 It was not within the scope of this report to investigate the budgetary relation between tax incentive schemes and TP. However, due to the indicated interrelation of both 
measures and the high relevance for developing countries, it appears recommendable to undertake further research on this topic in the future. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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In Honduras, which has implemented such special schemes since the early 1980s, it is estimated that approximately 90% 
of MNEs operate under them.50 In Ghana, the growing industry sectors of oil/petroleum and mining equally benefit from the 
existence such incentive schemes.51  
7.3.2.  Existing network of tax treaties 
Since  1954,  Ghana  has  entered  into  eight  DTAs,  including  with  its  main  European  trading  partners  (France,  the 
Netherlands and the UK). In comparison, Kenya‟s tax treaty network is slightly larger, as the country entered into a number 
of DTAs at a relatively early stage (1970-1980). However, out of 12, only one income tax treaty is with a major trading 
partner. Vietnam has an extensive network of more than 50 DTAs in place, with both regional as well as European and 
global trade partners. In this respect, Honduras still lags behind, with no income tax treaty currently in force and only one 
cooperation and exchange of information agreement with the USA, signed in 1990.52 
In sum, despite growing levels of international trade,  we observe  that many developing countries have not signed a 
corresponding network of DTAs with their  most-important trading partners. However, this is crucial in order to provide 
taxpayers with a legal mechanism to question double taxation and to put in place the legal foundations for the exchange of 
information. In addition to the  non-existence of specific TP legislation, developing countries often also lack domestic 
legislation which allows and accompanies cross-border exchanges of information. In this respect, general concerns on the 
treatment of exchanged information may negatively impact negotiations preparatory to signing DTAs. 
Some developing countries have identified the need to  sign DTAs and consciously aim at expanding their DTA networks.  
However, our research indicates that many developing countries still lag behind in this important aspect. In this context, 
developed countries should contribute their fair share by demonstrating that they are in principle prepared to enter into such 
negotiations. On the other hand, developing countries that have already signed a large number of DTAs often lack practice 
in their application.53 Sometimes DTAs are regarded as potential obstacles to FDI, but scientific evidence suggests that, on 
the contrary, such agreements provide investors with security and stability and are seen as a commitment to stable, correct 




                                                             
 
50 Unfortunately, no such data is available for the other selected countries. 
51 In particular, the beneficial regimes typically take the form of VAT and customs exemptions as well as increased capital allowances. 
52 However, Honduras is currently in the process of negotiating a DTA with Canada. For an overview on the tax treaties curr ently in force for the selected countries, see 
Appendix L. 
53 For example, as of 1 March 2010, Uzbekistan had effective DTAs with a total of 44 countries but, as of March 2010, there were  no cases of known in which they had 
been applied. See PwC (2010), “International Transfer Pricing 2011”. 
54 See Neumeyer, E., (2006) “Do double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?”, Journal of Development Studies, 43(8).  Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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7.3.3.  Existing TP legislation in selected countries 
7.3.3.1.  Introductory remarks: state of play in selected countries 
In developing countries, specific TP legislation has been subject to  considerably longer drawn-out discussion than in 
developed countries. The majority of countries considered are currently concentrating their efforts on the introduction and/or 
implementation of TP legislation. More advanced questions, such as APAs or simplified compliance procedures, have by 
and large not yet found their way into the local TP legislation of developing countries.55 It should be noted that, in many 
countries, TP legislation is not only relevant for  corporate income tax purposes but also for indirect taxation, e.g. some 
customs authorities challenge taxpayers in terms of customs duties, excise and VAT from a TP perspective. However, this 
is often based on customs guidance regarding the treatment of related-party transactions and is not specific TP legislation. 
The countries selected for this study are in very different stages of development with regard to TP. As  is outlined in this 
section, especially Kenya and Vietnam have adopted and implemented TP  legislation that in part leans heavily on the 
OECD‟s TP standards. In contrast, Honduras is currently on the verge of implementing TP legislation, whereas Ghana has 
not yet introduced any specific TP legislation. 
With regard to business, our research indicates that a large number of MNEs regard compliance with local tax legislation as 
a priority. This is because parent companies are usually settled in jurisdictions where the level of TP enforcement is 
comparatively strict. The compliance culture often also percolates through to local entities in developing countries because, 
for internal risk management purposes, tax is considered a high-risk area. Some tax authorities in developing countries 
have stated that specific features of MNE TP policies have come to their attention, such as risk-stripping of distributors and 
manufacturers,  transfers  of  locally  created  intangible  assets  for  little  or  no  consideration  and  over-compliance  with 
developed countries‟ TP legislation to the detriment of tax revenues in developing countries. 
7.3.3.2.  TP legislation in selected countries 
Many developing countries do not yet have specific TP legislation in place, but the number of jurisdictions analysing the 
possibility of introducing such legislation is increasing. As an example, China has already had local TP rules in place since 
the 1980s, but the promulgation of comprehensive TP legislation only took place in 2009. Examples of other developing 
countries that have recently introduced TP legislation include Turkey (2006), Uruguay and Kazakhstan (both in 2009), 
Uzbekistan (2010) and Georgia (2011). 
Of our selected countries, Vietnam  was the first to introduce specific TP legislation. The initial approach to TP was 
promulgated as early as 1997 with the guidelines for the implementation of DTAs, which allowed the tax administration to 




                                                             
 
55 However, it should be noted that some countries have recently implemented APA legislation, e.g. Turkey in 2007. India is currently in the process of implementing 
APAs (the Direct Taxes Code 2010 dealing with this will come into force in 2012). Transfer pricing and developing countries 
 
23 | P a g e  
 
DTAs. Four years later, in 2001, the Vietnamese authorities extended the TP legislation and specified the TP methods 
applying to transactions between related parties, referencing the three traditional methods advocated by the OECD. Since 
2004, all such transactions have been subject to the arm‟s length principle, to which official reference is made in a 2010 
Circular (66/2010/TT-BTC). Additionally, this Circular contains guidelines on subjects such as comparability analyses, TP 
methods, selection and application of the most appropriate method and TP documentation. The Circular outlines five 
applicable TP methods, which are very similar to the methods described in the OECD Guidelines (specific preference is 
expressed regarding the use of internal comparables whenever available). 
Policymakers  in  Honduras  recognised  the  need  for  specific  TP  legislation  in  2004  and  expressed  a  commitment  to 
introduce it in the near future. Only very recently, at the end of 2010, was a new draft decree presented intended to 
specifically address questions relating to tax avoidance and TP („Anti-evasion and TP Legislation‟).56 The decree proposes 
changes to the existing Tax Code, and introduces TP legislation and anti-avoidance rules. In its approach, Honduras 
adheres to existing international standards by orienting itself towards the OECD Guidelines. The draft legislation refers to 
the arm‟s length principle and contains components that are typically addressed in TP legislation, such as definitions of 
related parties, inter-company transactions and a list of TP methods regarded as acceptable for corporate income tax 
purposes. These methods are consistent with the methods outlined in the OECD Guidelines. 
In the case of Ghana, the need for TP legislation has been recognised, but none is expected to come into force before 
2013. The Ghana Revenue Authority has set up a committee to advance the development of such legislation and initial 
draft documents are currently being discussed at high political levels. These discussions reflect the firm commitment of 
Ghana to introduce TP legislation in the near future. Interviews conducted with the tax authorities for the purpose of this 
study furthermore suggest that the new TP legislation will build on existing provisions, but will also have input from existing 
international case law, the OECD Guidelines and best practices in other countries. Until now, the tax authorities in Ghana 
have applied a general anti-avoidance rule contained in the current tax legislation, under which related-party transactions 
are valued by reference to industry practice. Transactions are re-characterised by the tax authorities if entered into as part 
of a tax-avoidance scheme and if their legal form is not in line with their economic substance. Furthermore, similar action as 
under specific TP legislation has been taken under the provisions of the Technology Transfer Regulations, which came into 
force in 1992. These regulations limit the amount of royalties and management and technical service fees as well as 
payments for know-how that can be paid by MNEs to related parties located outside of Ghana‟s jurisdiction. Payments are 
regarded as unacceptable if: 
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Measures against Tax Evasion and Transfer Pricing), draft decree 2010.  Transfer pricing and developing countries 
 
24 | P a g e  
 
  the management agreements are not registered with the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, which administers 
the Technology Transfer Regulations; 
  the management agreements are registered, but the limitations on transferable amounts are exceeded. 
In 2006, Kenya adopted specific TP legislation in response to losing a TP case.57 In fact, the Kenyan Income Tax Act 
(section 18(3)) now explicitly  refers to the arm‟s length principle and provides tax authorities with a legal foundation to 
adjust transfer prices that they consider not to be at arm‟s length. Further guidance on application of the arm‟s length 
principle has been issued in separate TP legislation. Under this legislation, five methods can be applied to determine the 
appropriate transfer prices between related parties. These methods are in line with the OECD standard and, in principle, 
apply equally, though preference is given to transaction-based methods. The current TP legislation does not contain any 
thresholds or materiality clauses. Overall, the TP legislation is perceived as lacking clarity and giving rise to uncertainty. 
7.3.3.3.  Scope of TP legislation in place 
It should be noted that, in the countries that have already introduced specific TP legislation, its ambit in terms of the 
definition of related party is sometimes substantially wider than in most OECD member countries. The OECD materials do 
not define control58 other than as participation in the management control or capital of an enterprise. However, countries 
normally want to limit the scope and reach of their TP legislation to situations where one enterprise has the practical ability 
to dictate the terms and conditions under which transactions take place. A very broad scope of controlled transactions may 
result in transactions being brought within the scope of TP rules that, in reality, are subject to normal market forces and are 
conducted under arm‟s length conditions. This could result in an increased compliance burden for taxpayers, an increased 
compliance cost for tax administrations and a smaller pool of potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions. 
While some countries have imposed low thresholds regarding capital participation compared to international standards, 
other developing countries have not imposed thresholds at all (e.g. Uzbekistan) or consider direct or indirect involvement in 
management as a decisive criterion (e.g. Turkey). In some developing countries, the definition of related parties furthermore 
includes cross-border transactions with third parties registered in tax havens (e.g. Kazakhstan and Turkey). 
Vietnam has published TP guidance  that applies not only to companies  that are directly or indirectly related due to 
ownership or control criteria, but also to those that maintain extensive business relationships. In particular, the term „related 
parties‟ is defined more broadly, e.g. with respect to the capital participation threshold for related parties (20%) or the 




                                                             
 
57 National Council for Law Reporting/Kenya Law Reports (2011), “Unilever Kenya Limited v. The Commissioner for Income Tax” (Income Tax Appeal No. 753 of 2003), 
www.kenyalaw.org. For more information on the case, please refer to Appendix J, Box 2. 
58 Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention contains the following phrase in relation to control: “participates directly or indirectly in the management control or capital” of 
an enterprise. This definition does not specify a minimum level of participation for the control criterion to be fulfilled. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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The draft TP legislation currently being discussed in Honduras is mainly based on the definition of related parties as given 
in the OECD TP Guidelines, and applies to both cross-border and domestic inter-company transactions between related 
parties. Kenya‟s TP legislation is applicable to all that which have an enterprise located in Kenya and another enterprise 
located outside Kenya. Furthermore, the scope of the legislation includes transactions between permanent establishments 
and their head office/other related branches (branches are treated as separate enterprises). In a recent TP reform, Kenya 
has expanded the definition of related parties to include relationships between individuals. 
7.3.3.4.  TP documentation requirements  
Many developing countries that have introduced TP legislation have included TP documentation requirements, which oblige 
the taxpayer to keep documented evidence on related-party transactions and to submit such documentation on request. 
This is also the case in Kenya, where taxpayers must submit TP legislation upon request (within one month following a 
formal request). Although local tax authorities have interpreted this in the past as an obligation for the taxpayer to prepare 
TP documentation, there is no official guidance regarding the frequency and process for preparing it. In 2010, the Kenyan 
tax authorities introduced a special schedule to the annual tax return, which requires related parties to declare whether they 
have entered into related-party transactions. If they have, they must further disclose the quantum of such dealings and 
whether or not they have prepared TP documentation.59 
Together with legislation addressing the appropriateness of TP in related -party transactions, Vietnam has introduced 
specific legislation dealing with the documentation requirements for TP purposes. Taxpayers need to record and maintai n 
contemporaneous TP documentation, which has to be submitted within 30 days if requested by the tax authorities. An 
official circular (Circular 660) also outlines the content of such TP documentation: 
  general information on the business establishment and related parties; 
  the business establishment‟s transactions; 
  the methods of calculating the arm‟s length transfer price applied in related-party transactions. 
In addition, taxpayers are required to disclose their related-party transactions on a standard form attached to the annual 
corporate  tax  return.  This  information  must  be  submitted  within  90  days  following  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year.  TP 
documentation rules are also likely to come into force in Honduras as they are contained in draft legislation that is currently 
under discussion. Information on taxpayers‟ related-party transactions must be provided to the local tax authorities on 
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7.4.  Capacities of local tax administrations 
7.4.1. Public debt and revenue collection  
Just like most developed nations, developing countries suffer from public debt and, in some cases, depend on foreign aid. 
For Honduras, the IMF approved the equivalent of USD 202 mn (EUR 145 mn) in finance in late 2010. Overall, the 
countries  we  have considered  in  our  study  face  public  debt  due to  a structural  budgetary  deficit,  mainly  caused by 
increased government spending and falling tax revenues. The latter are often a downside of the policies pursued to 
increase  trade  and  foster  the  diversification  and  development  of  national  economies,  as  outlined  in  the  foregoing 
paragraphs. 
In response to public debt and structural deficits, developing countries take very different measures, but many aim to 
increase the amount of public revenues by augmenting tax collections. We did not obtain this information for all countries in 
the sample, but some have carried out administrative reforms to increase the efficiency of their national tax authorities. For 
example, Kenya has addressed problems within the tax administration and carried out reforms to alter its structure and 
strengthen revenue collection. 
7.4.2. Structure and capacities of local tax administrations 
In the selected countries, the local tax administrations have been subject to reforms and reorganisations that often affect 
responsibilities with regard to corporate income tax collection and the administration of MNEs, requiring specialisation 
within the revenue authorities. In Kenya, the reforms referred to above involved transforming a largely tax-type-based 
institution into a revenue authority organised along functional lines.60 This included offsetting up a large taxpayers office 
(„LTO‟) in 2006. By definition, companies with an annual turnover of more than USD 9 mn (EUR 6.4 mn) are dealt with by 
the LTO, currently amounting to 800 taxpayers. Within Kenya‟s LTO, a TP Unit has been set up with a team of about 12 tax 
officials, which it has been announced is to be increased to about 25 officials.61 In general, the Kenyan recruitment 
programme is robust and the tax administration offers competitive salaries, resulting in generally well-qualified tax officials. 
In Vietnam, the General Department of Taxes is divided into  sections at central and local level s. At  a central level, a 
particular department was set up for the administration of large enterprises. TP audits are  under the responsibility of the 
Inspectorate department, as part of general tax audits. Similar organisational structures can be observed in the Honduran 
tax administration, where large taxpayers are under the administration of a special department. However, the definition of a 
large taxpayer is currently too narrow to efficiently limit the number of taxpayers administered by this department. As part of 
this specialisation effort, Honduras has hired  in additional personnel and has been working with domestic and external 
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Due to the lack of specific TP legislation, the Ghanaian revenue authorities do not have staff exclusively working on TP. In 
the domestic tax division, there are about 4,000 employees, of whom 51 work in tax audits. Ghanaian tax officials are on 
average in charge of 360 cases/taxpayers. 
Most of the tax administrations of the selected countries publicly offer information on their local tax system in English. This 
applies to Ghana and Kenya, as well as Vietnam, which provides an English version of the website of the Ministry of 
Finance. For procedures, TP documentation in Kenya must be in English, which simplifies compliance for MNEs. On the 
other hand, TP documentation in Vietnam must be in Vietnamese, and all supporting documents need to be translated 
accordingly. 
7.4.3.  Experience with TP enforcement, audits and penalties 
In general, the countries we looked at  in this study are relatively inexperienced  in TP enforcement. The majority of 
developing countries seem not to conduct specific TP audits but rather challenge TP in a general tax audit. However, in 
many countries, the frequency of tax audits as such lags behind that of developed countries.62 Many, such as Ghana, lack 
the necessary legal TP foundation to audit transfer prices applied in related-party transactions. The same appears to go for 
penalties, as many countries have not introduced special TP penalties. 
In 2007, Vietnam became one of the few countries to initiate special TP audits. However, due to the lack of resources and 
expertise, only about five TP audits are conducted a year, and they usually form part of general tax audits. No specific audit 
procedure is set out for TP, nor is there any separate team of auditors within the Vietnamese General Department of Taxes 
to run such  specialised TP audits. Even though a substantial part of the information submitted by  taxpayers comes in 
electronic form, the tax authorities still lack the means to electronically screen and process this data in order to develop a 
risk-based audit strategy. Nevertheless, the tax authorities seem to make TP adjustments on a large scale. 
It should be noted that, under Vietnamese law, there is currently no specific penalty if the taxpayer fails to comply with the 
arm‟s length principle when setting prices or profit margins in related-party transactions. However, under certain conditions 
(e.g. in the case of false information), the tax authorities have the right to assess the appropriate transfer prices and to 
make corresponding adjustments to the figures declared by the taxpayer. Another aspect which increasingly attracts the 
attention  of  tax  authorities  are  historically  loss-making  companies.  The  authorities  lack  the  resources  and  technical 
equipment to closely follow up on the figures reported by large companies. 
This problem is also prevalent in Honduras, where insufficient technical knowledge, shortages of equipment and non-
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special tax regimes. Only recently has a special division been created dealing specially with large taxpayers. However, the 
Honduran tax administration itself still suffers from high staff-turnover levels as the administration is strongly linked to the 
governing parties. In Honduras, penalties can be levied if a declaration of related-party transactions proves to be inaccurate 
or false. The draft legislation authorises the tax authorities to adjust the amounts of costs, deductions, revenues, profits or 
losses reported by a taxpayer if prices in related-party transaction fall foul of the arm‟s length standard. In these cases, the 
agreed remuneration or profit margin between the related parties can be adjusted to the median of the arm‟s length range. 
For that purpose, the draft legislation under discussion in Honduras also provides a list of TP methods that are regarded as 
suitable for establishing the arm‟s length price of an inter-company transaction. 
In  Kenya,  the  TP  Unit  established  within  the  LTO  has  been  increasingly  asking  taxpayers  to  disclose  their  TP 
documentation since 2009 (in total, over 300 requests). Overall, the resources allocated to transfer pricing team were 
increased in the second half of 2009, including more personnel, training, subscriptions to benchmarking databases as well 
as a new team in the Medium Taxpayers Office. In addition to TP queries during general tax audits, desk TP audits have 
been based on documentation submitted by taxpayers. These audits have not been carried out as specific TP audits but 
instead formed part of general tax audits. 
7.4.4.  Internal training facilities and communication channels  
The capacity of tax authorities in developing countries to deal with TP reform processes varies depending on the general 
level of their experience of TP legislation. However, countries‟ ability to introduce tax reforms also greatly depends on the 
infrastructure already in place. This specifically encompasses training facilities for tax officials, networks for the interchange 
of information within the tax administration, automated systems to process new types of information/data, communication 
channels to inform and educate taxpayers, as well as the existence of bilateral or multilateral cooperation with other tax 
administrations. 
Ghana currently has very little experience with TP reform as no legislation has been brought in to date. However, as 
indicated in the previous sections, the Ghanaian Revenue Authority has set up a committee to spearhead the development 
of TP legislation. In this context, the committee has also initiated the process of sending national tax officials abroad, 
especially  to  neighbouring  countries  in  the  region  (such  as  South  Africa  and  Kenya),  in  order  to  leverage  on  their 
experience. However, extensive, structured training still needs to be instituted. In the light of upcoming TP legislation in 
Ghana, local tax authorities have also focused their efforts on automating tax records and data. Currently, all records are 
managed manually, which means data is not readily and easily accessible. This is particularly problematic since different 
local tax offices are at this stage not able to share information. In the past, this has led to a number of lapses and taxpayers 
have often had to produce records of taxes paid to other tax offices. Clearly, introducing TP reform would require IT 
facilities allowing tax offices to share data and experience in order to ensure uniform application of the new TP legislation 
and limit the uncertainty for taxpayers. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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In Kenya, the introduction of TP legislation in 2006 was the starting point for a number of reforms, enabling the tax 
administration to acquire certain experience. The reforms were mainly directed at capacity-building and administrative 
effectiveness, but were also aimed at creating appropriate TP legislation. Both the national tax administration and the ATAF 
identify the main challenges for African tax authorities as lying in a lack of capacity and expertise, which effectively prevents 
them from maximising the benefits from adopting TP legislation. For capacity-building purposes, the Kenyan Revenue 
Authority  runs  the  „Kenya  Revenue  Training  Institute‟,  which  provides  specialist  training  and  educational  events  in 
cooperation with external institutions, e.g. universities. However,  training seems to take place intermittently and, with 
respect to TP, has not been sufficiently targeted at a core TP team. 
Internal capacity-building also remains a challenge in the case of Vietnam. Even though the country has been able to draw 
on  the  support  of,  inter  alia,  the  Asian  Development  Bank  and  the  Japanese  National  Tax  Agency,  there  is  still  a 
fundamental lack of a structured training system and own training facilities. Currently, training is conducted on an ad hoc 
basis and provided to a large cross-section of tax officials rather than to a smaller group of officials to build TP expertise 
and specialised TP audit teams. This lack of targeted instruction could also hamper the successful implementation of TP 
reform. However, in the past, Vietnam has made promising approaches to taxpayer education. This is a vital step in 
promoting  and  implementing  reforms  as  not  only  tax  officials  but  also  taxpayers  must  be  made  aware  of  the  new 
compliance requirements. In particular, training materials for taxpayers have been made available on the website of the 
General Department for Taxes, and the TP legislation was announced both on the internet and through other media 
channels. The tax administration has set up a special structure to deal with TP queries from taxpayers and has moreover 
organised workshops to share experience relative to compliance needs with taxpayers and tax advisers. 
The tax authorities in Honduras are pursuing similar strategies with respect to their new TP legislation. In particular, the 
administration is currently preparing regulatory guidance for taxpayers, which is intended to reduce uncertainty with respect 
to the new TP legislation. In addition, the tax authorities are setting up technical TP training sessions based on cooperation 
with other regional tax authorities. The Honduran Executive Directorate of Income has been reorganised and has started an 
initiative for domestic and external training resources. 
7.5.  Interim conclusions: suitability for donor support in TP reform 
In the course of this section, we have selected a number of preconditions for TP reform having regard to the relevant 
economic and legal circumstances, as well as the current capacities of the local tax administrations in the selected 
countries. Our analysis indicates that significant progress has been made in the past, but some items should still be given 
further consideration before extensive TP reform is implemented. While Honduras has received a considerable amount of 
donor support in the recent past, the country still lacks a treaty network with its main trading partners. The Ghanaian 
revenue authorities should still be receiving donor support to increase local capacities and efficiency, and we feel that TP 
reform should only be regarded as realistically possible in the mid- to long-term. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
 
30 | P a g e  
 
On  the  other  hand,  Kenya  and  Vietnam  appear  to  be  more-suitable  candidates  for  TP  reform.  Both  countries  have 
experience with TP, but their current TP legislation should be redrafted in light of an analysis of the implications of some of 
its provisions and assess their usefulness and impact. Both countries have a number of tax treaties in place. Kenya has 
also become a member of the EAC, which will most likely boost cross-border trade and further increase the need for TP 
enforcement. The provision of donor support in conjunction with the close collaboration between the African administrations 
can foster the exchange of knowledge in the region (and in Africa through the ATAF). In addition, both Kenya and Vietnam 
have undertaken efforts to achieve a level of specialisation within the their tax administrations, simplifying the selection of 
target personnel for training and secondments and increasing the likelihood that donor resources for TP purposes would be 
used efficiently. The following charts offer an overview on the findings outlined above (see Figure 2).63 







                                                             
 
63 Graphs I – IV are intended for illustrative purposes and are based on our conclusions with regard to the selected preconditions evaluated in the previous sections. We 
have applied a scale from 0 (precondition not met) to 5 (precondition fully met) to the results within this range, indicating that the preconditions are partially met. 
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8.  Recommendations for future donor 
support in selected countries 
8.1.  Introductory remarks 
As indicated in the previous sections, developing countries are often assisted by international  organisations or other 
countries‟ tax administrations in developing their local TP legislation. For the selected countries, the extent of development 
cooperation has differed as regards both the organisations providing assistance and the amount of assistance received to 
date. It is important to point out that developing countries often undergo several reform projects simultaneously, including a 
number of projects that might be implemented in the area of tax. If such projects are supported by donors, TP reform 
processes should be scheduled and planned by taking into consideration such ongoing initiatives. This has implications for 
the level of coordination necessary for both donor organisations and local tax officials, and should influence the sequencing 
of action if developing countries are targeted for TP reform and donor support. 
The amount of development support for the selected countries varies significantly, especially regarding the extent of the 
assistance provided and the number of active donors. In the cases of Honduras and Vietnam, a significant level of support 
has been granted by other tax administrations of more-developed countries in the same region, e.g. the USA, Argentina 
and Mexico (for Honduras). Support by international organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank („IADB‟), 
Asian Development Bank („ADB‟), WB, International Finance Corporation („IFC‟) and IMF has been substantial for some 
countries but often focused on more general aspects relative to development of a tax administration (e.g. automation 
processes, risk management, fraud) than the development and implementation of specific TP legislation. 
For other developing countries, support has been limited. Until now, Ghana has only received limited assistance, and 
identifying best practices with respect to donor support is therefore difficult. Generally, there are a variety of different ways 
in  which  tax  authorities  in  developing  countries  can  be  supported  in  successfully  adopting  and/or  implementing  TP 
legislation in their jurisdictions. This involves, inter alia, knowledge and experience sharing, training and performance-
assessment support. An analysis of donor support to the selected countries up to the present forms the basis of our 
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8.2.  Universal and country-specific recommendations  
8.2.1.  Universal recommendations for selected countries 
Broadening of treaty networks and gaining practice in their application 
As indicated above, the selected countries should particularly draw attention to the development of a network of DTAs. This 
can foster the local investment climate by providing a legal mechanism to address potential cases of double taxation. As a 
valid point for all the selected countries, assistance should be sought and given by donors and more-experienced tax 
administrations to help create the appropriate domestic framework for, amongst others, exchanges of information. When 
seeking assistance in negotiating tax treaties, developing countries should be encouraged to join international cooperation 
structures and processes such as the OECD‟s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information.65 
 
Identification and pooling of local comparables 
Future action with regard to TP should not only focus on drafting and enacting comprehensive TP legislation but also on 
ensuring  that  implementation  of  such  provisions  is  feasible.  This  is  particularly  true  with  regard  to  the  lack  of  local 
comparables to substantiate the arm‟s length nature of related-party transactions in case of application of certain TP 
methods. It could be worth pursuing the development of databases that contain information on comparables on a local or 
pan-regional level. Regional tax administration forums could drive such projects forward. Funding could be provided by 
donor organisations to finance the development and continuous updating of such databases.66 However, development can 
prove difficult if no central repository for collecting financial data is in place, as is the case in some developing countries. 
 
Building TP expertise, competitive working conditions and adequate control mechanisms  
The selected countries should be assisted in the process of building a pool of well-trained, motivated specialists in the area 
of TP (a dedicated TP unit, judiciary). In addition, local tax administrations should also consider recruiting external TP 
specialists, e.g. from the private sector. For that purpose, strategic human resource („HR‟) policies must be tailored in 
accordance with the needs of local tax administrations. Such HR policies should involve a hiring process that attracts 
talented, experienced people and aim at maintaining core staff by offering attractive working conditions. Clearly, as tax 
officials‟ salary levels are subject to budgetary constraints, HR policies must ultimately seek to build intrinsic motivation by 
means of appraisal mechanisms, career opportunities and possibilities for professional development, e.g. through training, 
secondment, etc. This could also help to reduce high levels of staff turnover, which are commonly observed in developing 
countries and pose a threat to continuous improvement and knowledge management. It is also important to ensure that 




                                                             
 
65 This idea is also promoted by the EC: see EC(2010), COM (2010) 163 final, p. 6. For more information on the Global Forum, see www.oecd.org/tax/transparency. 
66 For an illustrative estimate of the costs of developing and updating a local database in Kenya, see Append ix N. Based on local subscription costs to the existing 
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In addition, suitable policies should be implemented to ensure tax officials‟ independence and prevent possible issues of 
discretion and potential links to corruption. This could, for instance, include annual independence and compliance checks, 
quality reviews by an internal audit division, continuous independence learning programmes, the development of a code of 
conduct as well as asset/wealth declarations. Taxpayers‟ files should be kept at a registry and only authorised staff should 
be allowed to consult files. Audits should be cross-checked by several senior tax auditors (at least two) and a rotation 
system with regard to audit assignments could help to avoid excessive familiarity with particular taxpayers. 
Developing risk-based TP audit procedures 
Furthermore,  tax  authorities  in  developing  countries  should  be  assisted  generally  in  developing  risk-based  audit 
procedures. Overall, it appears recommendable to implement mandatory filing requirements for annual accounts, and to 
ensure that from a procedural perspective, requests to taxpayers  to submit further TP documentation are sufficiently 
targeted and focussed on high-risk transactions. A general risk assessment for taxpayers could be envisaged, considering 
factors such as the size, structure and complexity of the business and its financing, the effective tax rate, the complexity of 
legal arrangements, openness and transparency and the history of cooperation with revenue bodies.67 For that purpose, 
donor support could borrow from the experience of tax administrations in developed countries (EU platforms on 
administrative cooperation, CIAT, IOTA and ATAF could be used to gather such information). Examples of such risk-based 
selection criteria for TP audit purposes could, for instance,  include transactions with tax havens and low-tax jurisdictions, 
back-to-back operations, structural losses, business  reorganisations and  management fees. The local economy and 
industry sectors should be taken into consideration when developing a system  for choosing high-risk transactions and 
taxpayers that should then be considered as targets for TP audit purposes. It is  important to ensure that the tax officials 
carrying out the TP audit are specialised / aware of potentially problematic TP transactions in advance  and comply with 
agreed time limits for audit procedures. The tax audit approach will always need to be tailored to the specific taxpayer (e.g. 
profit/loss situation, kinds of transactions, industry sector).68 However, general aspects such as materiality thresholds and 
the information that should be provided/requested for audit purposes can form part of a more-general TP audit strategy. 
8.2.2.  Country-specific recommendations: Kenya 
Even though Kenya has already introduced TP legislation, it should be offered assistance in revising its existing legislation 
and ensuring that it is adequately structured.69 In this context, technical assistance could also  be targeted at familiarising 
the local tax administration with the possibility  of making statutory provision  for APAs. Currently, there seems to be 
reluctance on the part of the revenue authorities in this regard, which could stem from the challenge posed in terms of 




                                                             
 
67 Please further refer to OECD (2007), Tax Intermediaries Study, Working Paper 5: Risk Management, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/59/39003865.pdf. 
68 For that reason, it may also be useful to offer the possibility of case-specific mentoring to tax administrations in developing countries. Such mentoring could be provided 
by more experienced tax administrations or international organisations such as the OECD or UN. 
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certainty for taxpayers and create an amenable fiscal environment for them. However, due to the considerable impact they 
are likely to have, assistance should be offered by external experts in technically drafting them. We have channelled the 
additional recommendations for donor support into short-, and medium-/long-term areas of support: 
Short-term areas of support: 
  Facilitation of secondment/employment of experienced TP officials from more-experienced tax administrations to the 
Kenyan revenue authorities. 
  Development of structured training programmes and assistance in the selection of appropriate resource persons. 
  Provision of detailed, practical reference materials such as TP manuals and guides. 
 
Medium- and long-term areas of support: 
  Technical assistance in introducing legal reforms in order to scrutinise existing legislation. Donors could offer the 
Kenyan revenue authorities services in the form of reviewing their TP legislation as it currently stands. 
8.2.3.  Country-specific recommendations: Ghana 
The local tax authorities in Ghana have indicated that they estimate their need for donor support as high. The main areas of 
assistance required are identified as follows (ranked in order of importance): 
1)  Technical support in the development and testing70 of TP legislation. 
2)  Training of tax officials and possible secondments of TP experts to the Ghana Revenue Authority in order to 
provide on-the-ground additional support.  
3)  Performance assessment of the effectiveness of the TP legislation once implemented. 
4)  In general, funding is required to undertake the actions listed above. 
The needs identified by the Ghana Revenue Authority already include assistance in the field of drafting TP legislation. We 
would  endorse  this  list  and  stress  that  special  attention  should  be  given  to  the  introduction  of  additional  disclosure 
requirements for MNEs, as these will provide some of the information required for TP purposes. Ghana has signed up to 
the EITI and involvement with more such similar initiatives will also contribute towards successful implementation of TP 
legislation. Based on our research and the interviews we have conducted, we identify the following actions as possible 




                                                             
 
70 The idea of testing tax law has only recently come up and is currently under discussion, e.g. Ayres, I., Listokin, Y., and Abramowicz, M., (2010) "Randomizing Law". 
Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 161. http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/161.  However, we feel that, with regard to TP, such testing may not lead to 
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  Investing in technical training for a significant number of local tax officials. Support should be obtained from the 
private sector and the donor community in terms of technical support, capacity building and funding to cover the 
costs of developing and taking training courses. 
  Tax officials at the Ghana Revenue Authority could be allowed to participate in secondment programmes to tax 
authorities in other countries that are more experienced in TP. 
  Computerisation of tax offices, taking the large taxpayer units as a starting point. 
8.2.4.  Country-specific recommendations: Honduras 
Partially due to the assistance received in the past from national and international organisations as well as from foreign tax 
authorities, Honduras is making considerable progress in the area of improving its policies and action in the area of TP. 
However,  further,  continuing  assistance  is  still  necessary  as  TP  enforcement  and  taxpayer  behaviour  increase  in 
complexity. 
The case for Honduras is very particular because the country is on the verge of introducing binding TP legislation. Based 
on the interviews carried out with government officials, international organisations and members of the Honduran business 
community, we make the following recommendations with respect to possible future donor support for Honduras: 
  Assistance in scheduling and establishing a fixed training period for the Anti-evasion and TP Legislation, whereby 
the legislation will enter into force after a fixed period of time (e.g. one year) in order to ensure a smooth transition. 
  Development of a phased approach to increase the compliance requirements for taxpayers step by step when the 
TP legislation comes into effect. Human capital and best practices will need to be developed and identified as well. 
A phased approach could be structured as follows:  
1)  Mandatory  questionnaire:  Assistance  in  designing  a  basic  TP  questionnaire  first  be  introduced  to 
taxpayers, requesting relevant information surrounding a taxpayer's inter-company transactions 
2)  Implementation  of  contemporaneous  TP  documentation  requirements:  Assistance  in  drafting  and 
implementation. 
3)  Gradual  introduction  of  APAs:  Building  capacities  and  knowledge  within  the  tax  authorities  prior  to 
accepting  APA  applications,  assisting  in  gaining  a  solid  understanding  of  particular  industries  and 
particular TP methods.  
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  Assistance in revising the initial TP legislation and evaluating whether all provisions included in the first draft are 
sound with regard to administrative burden and budgetary effects (e.g. definition of „related parties‟). 
  As an alternative to reducing the initial scope of the TP legislation, Honduras could make use of external auditors 
responsible for reviewing inter-company transactions reported by taxpayers. 
8.2.5.  Country-specific recommendations: Vietnam 
Vietnam has received a substantial amount of donor support during the last few years, and two donor organisations have 
furthermore provided direct support in the field of TP (JICA and ADB). As with most other developing countries, there is 
therefore still a demand for both support to assist the country in improving the implementation of TP legislation: 
  Legislative changes: 
-  Assistance  in  legislative  changes  to  introduce  comprehensive  TP  legislation.  Further  assistance  in 
introducing provisions on APAs, simplified compliance procedures and mutual agreement procedures. 
-  Assistance in the introduction of necessary changes to the existing accounting provisions to better record 
related party transactions. 
-  Assistance  in  designing  TP  documentation  requirements,  in  particular  in  determining  which  type  of 
information is necessary and should be reasonably collected from taxpayers. 
-  Sharing issues and experience in relation to implementing new TP legislation. 
  Building TP expertise: 
-  Developing structured training programmes for all tax officials, including general awareness-raising training, 
training of treaty operations and coordination of joint audits. 
-  Secondments for tax officials to tax administrations in other countries for on-the-job training. 
-  Helping to build a physical infrastructure (tax academy) and to develop training programmes. 
  IT infrastructure and support: 
-  Assistance in automating the collection and evaluation of TP-related information submitted by taxpayers. 
-  Assistance in developing and applying software to process TP-related information. 
-  Training on the use of IT infrastructure and other software. 
 
As indicated in the previous sections, the stages that the survey countries are at with regard to the introduction of TP 
legislation differ significantly. However, almost all of them have a real need for assistance from more-developed countries 
or international organisations. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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8.3.  Costs of TP reform and potential impact of increased tax collections in 
selected countries 
8.3.1.  Interview/research findings for selected countries 
It is difficult to quantify the costs of TP reform and its impact on increased tax collections on the basis of the interviews we 
have conducted in the selected countries. Statistical data to measure the impact  on tax revenues of introducing TP 
legislation  is  usually  not available.  Furthermore, some  of  the  possible  ramifications  of  TP  reform, such  as improved 
certainty and lower compliance costs for MNEs, which may attract additional investment, cannot be gauged within a 
quantitative assessment. However, it is also evident that substantial investment is necessary to adopt TP legislation. We 
elaborate below on the potential costs of TP reform process in the different countries and the expected cost drivers. 
Despite the lack of overall cost/benefit figures, for Vietnam, there are sample results attributable to the introduction and 
enforcement of TP legislation. Only recently, the revenue authorities inspected a group of 127 FDI companies that had 
reported consecutive losses. The tax audits resulted in overall adjustments of USD 76.3 mn (EUR 54.4 mn), which yielded 
additional tax revenues.72  
For Kenya, we did not obtain any specific figures with respect to the possible costs/benefits of TP reform.  However, as 
outlined in the previous sections, the share of  MNEs in total tax revenue is important, and hence the effect of increased 
efficiency in TP matters is likely to be material. Business representatives of MNEs have furthermore indicated that, in t he 
light of future, strictly enforced TP legislation in Kenya, they expect overall increasing awareness and scrutiny in related -
party transactions. 
Similarly, the Ghana Revenue Authority has not done a full calculation of the additional costs  occasioned by the TP 
legislation to be implemented in the next few years. The costs are expected to be mainly incurred in drafting the legislation, 
training staff abroad and developing a computerised tax system. The national tax administration in Ghana expects that the 
increase in tax collections  due to TP reform will exceed the costs of implementation. Some sources  estimate Ghana‟s 
revenue losses due to deemed non-arm‟s-length pricing in business transactions with the USA and the EU at EUR 83 mn.73 
Initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative („EITI‟)74 have the potential to cover related TP issues 




                                                             
 
72 We did not obtain official figures on the additional tax collections stemming from these adjustments, see Bang, H., (2011) “Brighter spotlight”, Vietnam Economic Times, 
March 2011, pp. 12–13. Assuming taxation at the standard corporate income tax rate (25%) and disregarding any tax incentive schemes or interest/penalty payments, the 
additional revenue would amount to USD 19.1 mn (EUR 13.6 mn).  
73 See Christian Aid (2009), “False profits: robbing the poor to keep the rich tax-free”, March 2009 report, http://www.christianaid. org.uk/Images/false-profits.pdf, p. 13; 
services not included. 
74 http://eiti.org/. Ghana was designated as EITI -compliant on 19 October 2010.  In short, the EITI aims to increase transparency in financial transactions between 
governments and companies within the extractive industries. It involves the full publication and verification of   company payments made to governments and of 
government revenues received from oil, gas and mining activities. These activities have the purpose of strengthening governance in resource-rich countries, with the spin-
off effect that revenues from natural resources will be directed to government spending on health, education and other development priorities.  Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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As an exception among the selected countries, the Honduras Ministry of Finance has done calculations and estimated that 
the introduction of TP reforms could enable local tax authorities to collect an additional HNL 8 bn in corporate income taxes 
annually  (approx.  USD 430  mn/EUR  301  mn,  resulting  in  a  67%  increase  in  income  taxes).75  Moreover, local tax 
administrations expect that the implementation of TP legislation will boost customs revenues as many MNEs currently class 
their inter-company transactions with Honduran subsidiaries as services rather than goods. Therefore, the TP reform 
process is widely regarded as a  means to assist Honduras in  meeting its overall goals of strengthening tax revenue 
collection and the tax administration‟s internal capacity to control, analyse and collect revenue. 
8.3.2.  Cost/impact estimations based on publicly available data 
In order to provide an indication of the possible costs of TP reform in the selected countries, we summarise the different 
items required for donor support (training, materials and other support) and done a quantification based on the information 
received from the relevant local tax administration and our experience in the field of TP. Subsequently, we compare these 
cost estimates with different growth scenarios for tax collections from MNEs stemming from the introduction of TP reform.76 
Even for low-growth scenarios, we find that the potential increase in tax collections  from introducing TP reform clearly 
outweighs the costs of TP reform in the selected countries (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Estimated impact/cost from TP reform for selected countries 
  Estimated benefit 
(obtained figures) 
Estimated benefit* 




(own calculations for 2012, 
low-impact scenario inc. 




Honduras  EUR 301 mn  EUR 4.4 mn  EUR 4.7 mn  EUR 836.357 
Kenya  n/a  EUR 4.3 mn  EUR 4.7 mn  EUR 266.913 
Ghana  n/a  EUR 7.9 mn   EUR 9.1 mn    EUR 964.388 
 
 
Vietnam  n/a  EUR 25.4 mn  EUR 27 mn  EUR 444.126 
*  Based on historic data, assuming an increase in tax collections from MNEs due to the introduction of TP reforms. 







                                                             
 
75 This figure was obtained from the Honduran tax authorities (unfortunately, we have no further information in this respect). Honduras collected HNL 11.9 bn or USD 
641.2 mn in income taxes in 2010. 
76 For the detailed calculations and the assumptions made, see Appendices N and O. We would emphasise that increased tax collect ions may be affected by other 
factors. However, we believe that the estimations are valid for an overall assessment of the scale of the possible costs and benefits from TP reform.  Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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9.  A general approach to TP reform in 
developing countries 
Given the differing levels of progress in some countries by comparison with others, it is difficult to set down a one-size-fits-
all approach. Accordingly, the costs of technical assistance programmes for different countries can vary significantly. A 
thorough analysis of the specific needs for each developing country with regard to its TP practices is necessary in order 
that available donor resources are used as efficiently as possible. However, prior to donor support being provided, it should 
be analysed at what stage of development the country is with regard to both the preconditions and TP-specific legislation 
(see Figure 3). Experience from other countries such as the USA, China and India77 show that the process of TP reform is 
lengthy and that it requires ongoing training and support.  
In general, developing countries without any kind of TP experience should be assisted in becoming acquainted with the 
arm‟s length principle on a high level. Based on this, a TP strategy should be developed that takes into account country-
specific circumstances and outlines the different steps in introducing TP legislation. Special attention should be paid to the 
recruitment and training of specialised TP staff. Issues such as risk-assessment procedures for audit purposes and APA or 
simplified compliance procedures are equally important, but should form part of subsequent efforts.78  
 
Stage 1: Countries that do not have TP legislation in place  
Naturally, the demand for donor support in countries without any TP legislation, is high. However, it  is important to 
thoroughly evaluate the country-specific situation. TP-specific assistance should be scheduled and tailored according to the 
outcome of this initial mapping exercise. Technical assistance should be provided  initially to establish a fundamental 
understanding of TP principles and methods within the local tax administration. Assistance is also needed with respect to 
the drafting and testing of TP legislation. In this context, it can be particularly helpful to provide the tax administration with 
examples of existing TP legislation in other countries. A select group of tax officials should be given the possibility of 
deepening  their  understanding  of  TP  either  in  external  training  sessions  or  by  attending  on-the-job  training,  e.g. 
secondments. 
 
Stage 2: Countries that are on the verge of adopting TP legislation   
Developing countries that have already drafted TP legislation require a different set of measures to support successful 
implementation. As both the tax administration and taxpayers are inexperienced in applying the new legislation, countries 
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specified period of time. Support, both technical and financial, will be necessary to ensure that the newly available taxpayer 
information is processed efficiently. This can be achieved by training on how to use data obtained for audit purposes (risk 
assessments) or assistance in IT infrastructure and systems. Shortly before/after implementation of the TP legislation, 
financial funding could be provided to facilitate and improve communication between taxpayers and tax administrations, 
e.g. by organising information sessions and establishing support channels/facilities. 
 
Figure 3: Staged approach to introducing TP reform 
 
 
Stage 3: Countries with existing TP legislation  
The group of developing countries that already have TP legislation in place needs to be subdivided into countries that have 
TP legislation and those that have published TP rules in the form of circulars. We recommend that countries should be 
assisted in adopting TP legislation as this provides taxpayers with greater certainty. In general, it is important to offer 
assistance in reviewing and revising existing legislation. To ensure the smooth application of TP legislation, developing 
countries  should  be  offered  assistance  on  the  use  of  foreign  comparables  and  pan-regional  data.  In  particular,  tax 
administrations should receive assistance and training on necessary comparability adjustments. It is important to ensure 
that comparability analyses performed by tax authorities are transparent and understandable to the taxpayer. Together with 
this, developing countries can be supported in drafting more-sophisticated TP legislation, such as APA and simplified 
compliance procedures, and in negotiating DTAs with important trading partners. The development of structured training 
programmes and the establishment of a physical training infrastructure, such as a tax academy, also appear to be useful 
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10. Concluding remarks on TP and 
developing countries  
 
As a result of globalisation, developing countries are increasingly faced with questions on the adequate pricing of related-
party transactions in a cross-border context. In this report, we address different issues surrounding TP and developing 
countries. Given the stage of their economic and administrative development, developing countries often face problems due 
to the lack of coherent TP legislation and the fact that local tax administrations have little or no expertise in the field of TP. 
Problems commonly encountered include the non-existence/inaccessibility of comparable data on third-party transactions 
and the shortage of basic IT systems for audit purposes and to conduct benchmarking studies. 
A number of international organisations have put the issue of TP in developing countries high on their agendas. The OECD 
Guidelines could serve as common global standards for TP and we would advocate that developing countries  orient 
themselves to these standards when adopting and implementing TP legislation. The UN TP Manual supports this move and 
underpins the arm‟s length principle. From a business and growth perspective, this development is welcome as it increases 
certainty and thus helps foster investment in emerging economies. 
One of the main points we draw attention to is that TP reform in developing countries should always be preceded by an 
analysis of local circumstances. In order to pave the way for TP, developing countries should ensure that they fulfil the 
basic economic and political preconditions (e.g. infrastructure, international trade, qualified workforce) as well as legal 
preconditions (e.g. comprehensive accounting rules, legal system allowing cross-border flows of capital and assets, tax 
treaty network). Furthermore, the organisation and capacity of the current local tax administration (e.g. educated staff, 
monitoring of revenues, training facilities) should be taken into consideration. In the absence of such preconditions, we feel 
that the introduction of comprehensive TP legislation could be premature and that donor support should rather focus on 
improving the general economic, legal and administrative conditions. 
Our analysis with regard to the countries selected for the purpose of this study in essence confirms this premiss. As an 
example, our field research in Ghana indicates that the country‟s local tax administration still faces capacity problems in 
data processing and sharing. Accordingly, and, from our perspective, rightly, TP legislation has not yet been implemented, 
but merely envisaged. Our study suggests the assistance that might be required and indicates that the amount of required 
donor support is indeed large. However, our findings also suggest that the possible benefits of TP reform in terms of an 
increase in tax collections would tend by far to outweigh the anticipated costs. 
As a general assessment for developing countries, assuming that the necessary preconditions are met, further analysis 
should be carried out to identify at what stage of TP reform the country currently is. According to the outcome of this 
mapping exercise, the country should be classed into one of three stages (countries that have no TP legislation in place; Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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those that are on the verge of implementing TP legislation; those with existing TP legislation). Donor support should 
thereafter prioritise the proposed action for each of the different stages outlined in this report (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Roadmap to TP reform  
 
We would emphasise that developing countries should be assisted such as allows them to gradually build up administrative 
capacities and TP expertise. There is a need for long-term assistance, which will not necessarily result in a big change all at 
once. The assistance could better be viewed as a coaching or partnership model, meaning that developing countries can 
ask for assistance when it is needed. International support must eventually aim at lifting the TP legislation of developing 
countries to a common international standard. Overall, there is a need to create far-reaching TP legislation in developing 
countries in order to reduce economic and legal uncertainty and foster investment and growth. It is important to understand 
that TP reform should not be framed as anti-abuse legislation but should rather aim at improving the existing rules on 
corporate income tax. The majority of taxpayers want to be compliant with local TP requirements, and seek guidance on 
how to apply the appropriate remuneration for related-party transactions. For TP and developing countries, comprehensive 
TP legislation and consistent, efficient implementation can create considerable benefits but, at the current stage, require 
properly targeted, ongoing donor support. 
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Appendix A: List of developing countries 
As referred to in the report based on the World Bank classification79 
 
East Asia and Pacific 
American Samoa  Malaysia  Samoa 
Cambodia  Marshall Islands  Solomon Islands 
China  Micronesia, Fed. Sts  Thailand 
Fiji  Mongolia  Timor-Leste 
Indonesia  Myanmar  Tuvalu 
Kiribati  Palau  Tonga 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  Papua New Guinea  Vanuatu 
Lao PDR  Philippines  Vietnam 
Europe and Central Asia 
Albania  Kosovo  Serbia 
Armenia  Kyrgyz Republic  Tajikistan 
Azerbaijan  Lithuania  Turkey 
Belarus  Macedonia, FYR  Turkmenistan 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Moldova  Ukraine 
Bulgaria  Montenegro  Uzbekistan 
Georgia  Romania    
Kazakhstan  Russian Federation   
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda  Dominican Republic  Nicaragua 
Argentina  Ecuador  Panama 
Belize  El Salvador  Paraguay 
Bolivia  Grenada  Peru 
Brazil  Guatemala  St. Kitts and Nevis 
Chile  Guyana  St. Lucia 
Colombia  Haiti  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Costa Rica  Honduras  Suriname 
Cuba  Jamaica  Uruguay 




                                                             
 
79 Country and Lending Groups; http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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Middle East and North Africa 
Algeria  Jordan  Tunisia 
Djibouti  Lebanon  West Bank and Gaza 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Libya  Yemen, Rep. 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Morocco    
Iraq  Syrian Arab Republic   
South Asia 
Afghanistan  India  Pakistan 
Bangladesh  Maldives  Sri Lanka 
Bhutan  Nepal    
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola  Gambia, The  Nigeria 
Benin  Ghana  Rwanda 
Botswana  Guinea  São Tomé and Principe 
Burkina Faso  Guinea-Bissau  Senegal 
Burundi  Kenya  Seychelles 
Cameroon  Lesotho  Sierra Leone 
Cape Verde  Liberia  Somalia 
Central African Republic  Madagascar  South Africa 
Chad  Malawi  Sudan 
Comoros  Mali  Swaziland 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Mauritania  Tanzania 
Congo, Rep  Mauritius  Togo 
Ivory Coast  Mayotte  Uganda 
Eritrea  Mozambique  Zambia 
Ethiopia  Namibia  Zimbabwe 
Gabon  Niger   
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1. Development of local TP legislation  
China is one of the first developing countries to have had national TP legislation in place, introduced in the early 1990s (a 
set of local TP rules had already been observed in the 1980s). However, the first comprehensive TP legislation, which was 
based on and included all previous rules with regard to TP, was promulgated in January 2009.80 Previously, in 2008, China 
had enacted a new corporate income tax law, which stipulates the arm‟s length principle as the guiding principle for related-
party transactions and enables the Chinese revenue authorities to adjust taxable income if related-party remunerations are 
not found to be at arm‟s length. During development of its TP legislation, external consultants were contracted to conduct 
research on other developing countries‟ legislation and were invited to comment on the draft legislation. 
 
2. Scope of TP legislation, documentation requirements and TP audit practices 
With regard to the definition of related parties, China follows international standards as contained in the OECD Guidelines. 
Taxpayers are required to maintain contemporaneous TP documentation and have to  provide such documentation, if 
requested, within 20 days. However, the Chinese legislation contains some administrative simplification measures, which 
relieve taxpayers from this obligation if:81  
(1) Volume of related-party transactions  The annual amount of related-party purchases/sales < RMB 200 mn (EUR 
21,4 mn) and for all other types of transactions < RMB 40 mn (EUR 4,3 mn) 
(2) Existence of an APA  The related-party transactions are covered by an APA 
(3) Shareholding  The foreign shareholding of the enterprise is < 50%, and the taxpayer has 
only domestic related-party transactions 
 
Chinese  tax  authorities  focus  increasingly  on  nationwide  (companies  within  a  group)  and  industry-wide82  TP audits. 
Circular 2 also provides an overview of taxpayer characteristics that will typically trigger a specific TP audit. These include: 
  Significant amount or numerous types of related-party transactions (no threshold); 
  Long-term consecutive losses, low profitability or fluctuating pattern of profits/losses; 
  Lower profitability compared to other taxpayers in the same industry or compared to the functions/risks of the 
company; 
  Business dealings with related parties in tax havens; 




                                                             
 
80 Circular Guo shui fa [2009] No. 2, hereinafter „Circular 2‟. 
81 The following administrative simplification measures are not applicable to loss -making entities with limited functions and risks (they automatically have to submit 
contemporaneous TP documentation to the tax authorities). 
82 In particular, revenue authorities have targeted office automation and computer contract manufacturing industries. The automo tive sectors and the pharmaceutical 
industry receive increasing attention. This can be explained partly by the fact that transactions involving royalties and service fee remittances are increasingly targeted. 
Furthermore, the Chinese revenue authorities have announced in their TP enforcement plan for 2011 that trading, services and finance activities will be focused on. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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  Other situations indicating breach of the arm‟s length principle. 
 
3. Experience with TP reform/structure of tax administration  
China's anti-tax avoidance officials are organised as follows: at central level (SAT level, a designated team), provincial 
level/municipal level (a designated team is available), city level (in most cases, a designated team is available) and local 
level (usually no designated team). The SAT gives instructions in terms of TP enforcement to all lower-level tax authorities; 
the provincial level/municipal level tax authorities may give instructions to their lower-level tax authorities. A TP audit needs 
to be approved by the SAT before it is formally initiated even though local-level, city-level and provincial-level tax authorities 
may already have done a significant amount of analysis or assessment. A settlement needs to be initiated at local/city level 
and approved at provincial level, and then by the SAT. In general, depending on the nature of the tasks, the SAT mostly 
acts just as a technical adviser and approver while the provincial/city/local tax authorities act as enforcers, although 
sometimes the provincial level also serves as a technical adviser and as a middle-man between the city/local authorities 
and the SAT. At SAT level, the anti-avoidance division consists of six people, and a corresponding number at provincial/city 
level. The total number of tax officials specialised in anti-tax avoidance is 228. Chinese tax authorities organise their own 
training, but TP practitioners are often invited. Some anti-tax avoidance tax officials have been sent to the US Internal 
Revenue Service or other tax authorities for overseas training. Nevertheless, there are still knowledge gaps between China 
and countries/territories more experienced in TP. In addition, the resources of the tax administration seem to be scarce. 
However, in 2009, it announced the appointment of a specialised team of 500 officials.  Since 2009, there has been at least 
one further national training course on a specific industry in TP issues. 
 
4. TP Adjustments in China 
The budgetary impact of TP enforcement in China is illustrated by the scale and increase of TP adjustments over recent 
years (see table on TP adjustments, below). In general, Chinese tax authorities have developed a trend of focusing on 
larger transactions for TP audits. This “quality over quantity” approach has turned out to be highly effective and resulted in a 
significant increase in adjustments due to larger adjustments being made in individual cases. 
  
Year  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 




RMB 4.2 bn  
(EUR 442 bn)  
RMB 5.8 bn  
(EUR 610 bn) 
RMB 9.0 bn 
(EUR 946 bn) 
RMB 15.8 bn 
(EUR 1.66 bn) 
RMB 16.1 bn 
(EUR 1.69 bn) 
RMB 16.5 bn  
(EUR 1.73 bn)  
Adjustments 
to tax payable 
RMB 0.5 bn  
(EUR 53 mn) 
RMB 0.7 bn  
(EUR 74 mn) 
RMB 1.0 bn 
(EUR 105 mn) 
RMB 1.2 bn  
(EUR 126 mn) 
RMB 2.1 bn 
(EUR 221 mn) 
RMB 2.3 bn  
(EUR 242 mn) 
 
In addition, the mutual agreement procedure processes seem to be very effective. In 2010, Chinese revenue authorities 
helped MNEs to eliminate RMB 5.029 bn (EUR 529 mn) in double taxation. They are also actively involved in international 
activities, such as OECD events and assignment programmes. 
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1. Development of local TP legislation  
India witnessed immense growth and liberalisation during the 1990s, putting TP high on the agenda. In response, the 
Central  Government  formed  an  Expert  Group,  which  was  responsible  for  formulation  of  the  TP  legislation.  External 
agencies, industry bodies and company representatives assisted in developing the TP legislation. The TP legislation was 
approved by the Indian parliament in 2001, and came into force as from financial year 2001. The legislation was issued 
along with Rules notified by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). The basic framework of the legislation was based 
on the OECD guidelines, with certain exceptions in terms of the use of mean values, the +/-5% range, maintenance of 
contemporaneous documentation, filing of an accountant‟s certificate, etc.83  
2. Scope of TP legislation, documentation requirements and TP audit practices 
The  Indian  TP  legislation  contains  an  extensive  definition  of  associated  enterprises.  While  adhering  to  the  OECD 
convention in terms of participation and control, India has put in place more-specific parameters, including: 
  advancement of a loan by an enterprise that constitutes 51% or more of the total book value of the assets of the 
borrowing enterprise; 
  complete dependence of an enterprise (in carrying on its business) on the intellectual property licensed to it by 
another enterprise; 
  substantial purchase of raw materials/sale of manufactured goods by an enterprise from/to the other enterprise at 
prices and conditions influenced by the latter.84 
Indian TP law requires maintenance of contemporaneous documentation and requires application of the “most appropriate” 
of the five methods for determining TP. The prescribed methods are as outlined in the OECD Guidelines. TP audits are 
conducted  in  the  course  of  regular  tax  assessments  by  specialised  transfer  pricing  officers.  Internal  administrative 
guidelines provide that, in general, all taxpayers with a total value of related-party international transactions above INR 150 




                                                             
 
83 This rule has been amended in India‟s Finance Bill 2011, whereby an allowable variation will be notified for different business activities and types of transactions. The 
new rule will be applicable form April 2012 (assessment year 2012/2013). The government had initially proposed to have „safe harbour‟ rules, but instead has introduced 
the concept of „allowable variation‟. Therefore, in respect of financial years beginning on or after 1 April 2011, no margin will be available to the taxpayer until such time as 
the government gives notice of the margin. 
84 Effective from June 2011, entities located in tax havens will be treated as an associated enterprise (this provision was intr oduced by India‟s Finance Bill 2011, which 
has now been approved by the Parliament). 
85 The amount was INR 50 million, which was raised by means of an internal circular. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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3. Experiences with TP reform/structure of tax administration  
Within the Indian Revenue authorities, there is a special unit dedicated to TP, which deals with TP-related questions in the 
course of tax assessments. Overall, the Indian authorities pursue an active approach with regard to training its TP staff, 
including sending them overseas for conferences. These initiatives have been highly effective and have resulted in a steep 
learning curve. The TP unit was set up comprising senior-level tax officials, known as transfer pricing officers (TPOs), 
drawn from the grades of assistant directors and joint directors of income tax (transfer pricing) and is stationed across the 
country. The contingent of TPOs in each jurisdiction is headed up by a director of income tax (TP), under the aegis of the 
Director General of International Tax. The TPOs are subject to internal transfers within the Department to different locations 
in the country. TPOs have wide-ranging powers, including inspection, survey and inquiry. They are assisted by inspectors 
and officers attached to the TP unit. In 2007, the Revenue department faced an acute shortage of skilled officers for 
carrying out TP audits (each TPO handled about 250 TP cases a year) and, in the following year, the TP authorities 
significantly expanded the headcount to 70.86 
 
In addition, during 2009 (pertaining to  the TP assessment of AY 2006-07), a special unit was created called the Dispute 
Resolution Panel (DRP), consisting of a collegium of three tax officers: Director of Income Tax (TP), Director of Income Tax 
(International Taxation) and Commissioner of Income Tax. However, in the DRP‟s first year, in almost all cases the DRP 
upheld the adjustment; this led to more cases being brought before the Tax Tribunal. It had been announced that safe 
harbour rules would be issued for non-core services in 2009, but their implementation was not driven forward due to 
feasibility discussions. 
 
4. TP adjustments in India 
The amounts of adjustments as a consequence of TP assessments have been steadily increasing since the introduction of 
TP legislation in 2001. Although current figures are difficult to obtain, there are estimates regarding the proportion of 
adjusted cases and total amounts for 2002 – 2005:87 
 
Assessment Year  2002–2003  2003–2004  2004–2005 
Cases assessed/ Cases adjusted  1061/ 239  1501/ 337  1768/ 471 
Percentage  23%  22%  27% 
Total TP adjustments (in USD mn)  305  572  858 
 
Indian Revenue authorities have targeted transfer pricing aggressively and the rise in TP disputes has resulted in existing 




                                                             
 
86 TP Week, India creates dedicated team of 70 transfer pricing officers, 17 April 2008. 
87 TP Week, 24% of Indian TP audits lead to adjustment, 19 February 2008. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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potentially large tax outflow for MNEs. Adjustments to transfer prices have been disputed by taxpayers and, more often 
than not, both sides have appealed matters to the tax courts. Challenges have been that TP is a subjective matter and 
economic principles guide pricing, hence the courts, which generally interpret application of law, have not necessarily 
provided consistent answers on TP disputes. This is where the DRP, as a settlement body, is expected to play an important 
role going forward. 
 
5. The future of TP legislation in India  
The government has expanded the scope of TP to cover companies having transactions with countries that are reluctant to 
exchange information and are typically low-tax jurisdictions. Though various tax treaties with India provide for resolution of 
double taxation through MAP, the increasing number of cases has prompted the Finance Ministry to propose the institution 
of APAs as part of the DTC to mitigate and/or reduce litigation and provide certainty to MNCs in their TP arrangements. The 
Direct Tax Code already contains general provisions relating to APA, and some further norms will most likely come into 
effect in April 2012. 
 
In February 2011, the Indian Finance Minister acknowledged that the TP legislation was not yet as comprehensive as in 
developed countries. For that reason, a committee was set up to evaluate possibly upgrading the TP legislation in order to 
provide information on TP aspects and the treatment of intangible assets. 
 
   Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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1. Development of local TP legislation  
The application of the arm‟s length principle for TP purposes in the United States dates back to 1934, and the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service („IRS‟) has issued additional regulations in 1968, 1986, 1994, 2003, and 2009. During the last three 
decades, the IRS has served as one of the „trend-setters‟ in the area of TP, and its approaches to TP regulation have 
provoked controversy on a global scale given the importance of the U.S. market for MNEs. In general, the TP regulatory 
framework in the United States is very detailed due to the characteristics of the U.S. corporate tax system. 
 
2. Scope of TP law, TP documentation requirements, and TP audit practices 
Transfer pricing is applicable to all controlled taxpayers in the United States. According to the IRS, control is defined as two 
or more organizations being owned or controlled, managerially or operationally, directly or indirectly, by the same interests. 
Generally the threshold for control in the United States is considered to be at least 50%, but it can be less when the entity is 
effectively controlled. 
In the United States, the burden of proof is generally placed on the taxpayer. Therefore, taxpayers should maintain 
sufficient contemporaneous TP documentation to prove that the transfer price and the selected TP method are consistent 
with the arm‟s length standard. The regulations do not require documentation to be in place prior to filing the tax return, but 
filing documentation after the tax return is filed would not provide for penalty protection in case of a dispute with the IRS. 
The  IRS  typically  requests  taxpayers  to  produce  supporting  TP  documentation,  and  taxpayers  have  to  submit  such 
documentation within 30 days of any such request. TP regulations outline in detail which documents and information should 
form part of such documentation. 
The IRS routinely reviews the inter-company prices and TP policies of the U.S. tax returns of MNEs, and this review is not 
limited to cases where avoidance is suspected. Neither the IRS nor the Treasury publishes any statistics on the number of 
cases or the amount of dollars associated with TP issues. 
The IRS approaches transfer pricing tax audits on a case-by-case basis, and the number of examiners assigned to a case 
generally varies from one to four. There are about 600 international examiners nationwide and about 140 economists. 
These IRS personnel handle the bulk of the TP cases. 
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3. The structure of the Internal Revenue Service  
The IRS has a separate division dealing with Large Business and International („LB&I‟), which is organized along six 
industries and one examination support function. These include: 
  Communications, Technology and Media; 
  Financial Services; 
  Heavy Manufacturing and Transportation; 
  Natural Resources and Construction; 
  Retailers, Food, Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare; 
  Global High Wealth; and 
  Field Specialists.88 
The IRS considers its employees to be one of its most important assets. The recruitment, development, and retention of 
highly skilled and satisfied staff constitute one of the IRS‟s strategic initiatives. For that purpose, the IRS provides tax 
personnel with special training in different areas to help them identify and understand issues in a complex and cross-border 
international environment, including economic analysis. Besides training employees, the IRS also focuses on training tax 
practitioners and tax preparers to increase the level of compliance. 
4. Costs and benefits of TP in the United States 
The IRS does not provide a breakdown of the income generated through TP audits. However, the IRS continues to direct 
resources toward enforcement.  In 2007, the IRS collected USD 12.60 for every dollar spent on enforcement. Additionally, 
the number of IRS economists with transfer pricing expertise has increased by 50% over the last two years, which is a 
signal that more in-depth audits can be expected. 
A 2007 Report to Congress states that verification of compliance by taxpayers is facilitated when IRS examiners have 
access to contemporaneous documentation that describes the methodology used by the taxpayer to apply the arm‟s length 
standard.89 When documentation is generated by taxpayers and analyzed by the IRS, it tends to increase the overall 
efficiency of the examination, because it becomes possible to identify key transfer pricing issues early in the process. Early 
identification of issues allows the IRS to concentrate examination resources on those controlled transactions that raise the 




                                                             
 
88 IRS, Large Business and International Division at-a-glance, 2011, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=96387,00.html.  
89  Department  of  the  Treasury,  Report  to  Congress  on  Earnings  Stripping,  Transfer  Pricing  and  U.S.  Income  Tax  Treaties,  November  28,  2007, 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ajca2007.pdf. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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One of the largest transfer pricing disputes with the IRS in recent years was the Glaxo SmithKline case.  A settlement was 
announced in that case in 2006 with a single payment of USD 3.4 bn. The case covered the period 1985 to 2005 and 
involved the treatment of intangibles related to R&D and Marketing. Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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Appendix G: Basic questionnaire used for local interviews 
 
1.  How important are MNEs in Ghana/ Kenya/Honduras/Vietnam in terms of contribution to tax revenue and 
GDP? 
2.  Can you comment/ describe on their general behaviour in terms of tax compliance? 
3.  How adequate are Ghana‟s/ Kenya‟s/ Honduras‟/ Vietnam's current TP rules particularly in the face of the 
current surge in MNEs through the main sector in their respective countries? 
4.  In Honduras and in Ghana, do you think specific TP rules should be adopted? What contribution would their 
adoption make to domestic tax revenue in both the short term and long term? 
5.  How much is Ghana/ Kenya/Honduras/ Vietnam investing in TP adoption and development? Which areas are 
the investments being channelled towards (staff training, computerisation, and subscription to databases)? 
6.  For  the  countries  that  already  have  TP  legislation,  what  proposed  amendments  are  the  tax  authorities 
considering and are these going to be in the form of dedicated TP regulations or amendments to the existing 
legislation? When are these expected to be in force? 
7.  What input, if any, will the OECD Guidelines have in development of TP rules in Ghana/ Kenya/ Honduras/ 
Vietnam? 
8.  What  difficulties  do  the  tax  authorities  in  Ghana/Kenya/Honduras/Vietnam  anticipate  in  implementing 
extensive TP rules?  Is the donor community expected to play a role in this? 
9.  Have the tax authorities undertaken any tax audits specifically relating to transfer prices of MNEs in Ghana/ 
Kenya/ Honduras/ Vietnam? 
10. Have the tax authorities conducted any studies on TP in Ghana/ Kenya/ Honduras/ Vietnam which may be 
useful to us? 
11. How much do you anticipate it will cost to implement TP rules in Ghana/ Kenya/ Honduras/ Vietnam, and will 
the benefits justify this cost? 
12. What mechanisms for dispute resolution with respect to double taxation do the tax authorities have with other 
countries? 
13. Have the tax authorities invested in training any local officers abroad on recent trends in TP? 
14. Have the tax authorities obtained or solicited private sector support with respect to the development of TP 
rules in Ghana/ Kenya/ Honduras/ Vietnam? 
15. What  challenges  do  the  tax  authorities  anticipate  with  respect  to  developing  TP  rules  and  what 
recommendations do you have on mitigating these challenges? 
16. Are the TP rules being developed have any input from case law, statutory law or tax treaties? 
17. What IT and other infrastructure including databases and information exchange have the tax authorities put in 
place to support the TP set up in Ghana/Kenya/Honduras/ Vietnam? Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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18. In which of these areas do the tax authorities wish to have more donor support – financial, technical, training, 
people or performance assessment? 
19. To what extent will the tax authorities take part in the exchange of information, country-by-country-reporting 
and other initiatives which will enhance the TP base? 
20. Are the tax authorities going to accept APA or TP documentation? 
21. Which industry groups will TP target? 
22. Which TP method do you propose to use: comparable uncontrolled price method, cost plus method, resale 
price method, transactional net margin method or profit split method? 
23. Will the tax authorities educate the MNEs and the public before the introduction of the TP rules? 
24. Are the tax authorities going to develop their own TP database or will they subscribe to SMART, Amadeus or 
other database? 
25. Will the tax authorities be conducting benchmarking studies to develop their own database? 
26. Will  MNEs  be  required  to  provide  annual  information  on  the  basis  on  which  their  transfer  prices  were 
determined? 
   Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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Appendix H:  Required donor 
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Appendix H: Required donor support in selected countries 
1. Donor support recommendations Kenya* 
* list not intended to be exhaustive 
Possible Donor Support  Provider   Recipient   Format  Timing                                   
(estimated)  Resources needed 
1. Training 
Accounting practices  
(not recommended)    
General tax  
(not recommended)    
Transfer pricing   OECD / Independent 
transfer pricing consultant 
KRA TP team - estimated 








OECD / independent 
economist consultant 
Face-to-face training  Physical training facilities  Audit practices and effective 
management (e.g. data 
processing) 
OECD 
Tax administration  
(not recommended)    
APA mechanism/ MAP 
procedure  OECD / ATAF  KRA TP team - estimated 
staff number 15  Face-to-face training  Continuous  Physical training facilities 
Language courses  
(not recommended)    Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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2. Materials 
IT hardware / infrastructure 
support (not required - KRA 
has required IT infrastructure to 
support its TP activities) 
  
Databases for comparables  Third-party database 
providers such as BVD  ATAF / KRA/ Tax payers  Development of 
database  1 year 
To be determined on-site 
Macroeconomic analysis  Third-party specialist 
economists  Ministry of Finance / KRA  Research report  3 months 
Manuals and technical training 
materials 
EC financing of ATAF TP 
taskforce on putting 
together training materials 
and manuals 
Support to be provided to 
ATAF TP taskforce 
Online or face-to-face 
interaction  6 months 
Decided cases, Experience 
of tax authorities in more 
advanced countries etc. 
Draft legislation 
Independent TP consultant 
with legislative drafting 
background or tax 
legislation drafting expert 
from the UK 
Ministry of Finance / KRA  Draft legislation  3 months  Tax legislation drafting 
expert 
Databases for tax 
administrations (e.g. online 
forum) 
Third-party IT consultants  ATAF / KRA  Provision of required 
infrastructure  1 month  Internet accessibility 
3. Other 
materials 
Knowledge databases for Tax 
administration and tax payers 
(available in other support 
areas)  
  
Public accessibility to 
legislation and administrative 
guidelines (Not required - KRA 
has a comprehensive website 
where materials and 




support   Secondments   See TP training in "1" above 
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2. Donor support recommendations Ghana*   
     
* list not intended to be exhaustive 





Accounting practices  
Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
Ghana; University of Ghana 
Business School  Officials and members of the 
Ghana Revenue Authority, 
taxpayers 
Face-to-face training and 
introduction to 
international accounting 
standards, online access 







General tax  
Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
Ghana; Chartered Institute of 
Taxation, Ghana; University of 
Ghana Business School 
Face-to-face training, 
online access to training 
materials 
Transfer pricing  
Chartered Institute of Taxation, 
Ghana; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Ghana 
Officials and members of the 
Ghana Revenue Authority, MNEs 
Income Tax  Chartered Institute of Taxation, 
Ghana    
Officials and members of the 




University of Ghana Business 
School,  Department of Economics, 
Department of Statistics - University 
of Ghana 
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning, officials of the Ghana 
Revenue Authority 
Audit practices and effective 
management (e.g. data 
processing) 
Chartered Institute of Taxation, 
Ghana; Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Ghana 
Officials and members of the 
Ghana Revenue Authority, 
taxpayers 
Tax administration (audit 
procedure, internal structure 
of tax administration checks & 
balances) 
Ghana Revenue Authority and other 
Tax administration  
Officials of the Ghana Revenue 
Authority,  Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Face-to-face training 
APA mechanism/ MAP 
procedure  External consultants  Officials of the Ghana Revenue 
Authority, taxpayers 
Introduction the APA and 
MAP procedure and 
training Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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2. Materials  
IT hardware / infrastructure 
support  External consultants  Tax authorities 
Materials (e.g. computer, 





resources  Databases for comparables 
Third party database providers such 
as BVD and development of regional 
databases  Officials of the Ghana Revenue 
Authority 
Development of 
databases and training 
Macroeconomic analysis  Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning 
Development of 
databases and training 
Financial 
resources 
Manuals and technical 
training materials 
Kenyan Revenue Authority; South 
African Revenue Service 
Officials of the Ghana Revenue 
Authority, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning 
Textbooks for training 
purposes (including for 
transfer pricing and 
general income tax 
training) 
3 - 6 months 
Draft legislation  International Monetary Fund  Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning  Face-to-face training 
3. Other 
materials  
Knowledge databases for Tax 
administration and tax payers  
Kenyan Revenue Authority; South 
African Revenue Service 
Officials and members of the 
Ghana Revenue Authority 
Development of / access 
to online platform 
3 - 6 months  Financial 
resources 
Public accessibility to 
legislation and administrative 
guidelines 





support    Secondments   Kenyan Revenue Authority; South 
African Revenue Service 
Officials of the Ghana Revenue 
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3. Donor support recommendations Honduras* 
       
* list not intended to be exhaustive 
Possible Donor Support  Provider   Recipient   Format  Timing                         
(estimated)  Resources needed 
1. Training 
Accounting practices  
External consultants 
Honduran Executive 
Directorate of Income 








Physical training facilities, two 
instructors, books, other training 
materials 
General tax  
Transfer pricing  
Income Tax 
Economics/Statistics and related 
knowledge 
Audit practices and effective 
management (e.g. data processing) 
Tax administration (audit procedure, 
internal structure of tax 
administration checks & balances) 
APA mechanism/ MAP procedure 
Language courses  Classroom and/or 
online course 
Physical training facilities, two 
instructors, books, other training 
materials, online courses Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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2. Materials 




DEI and COHPUCP  IT and infrastructure 
hardware 
n/a 
Computers for each TP analyst and 
for COHPUCP for training 
purposes, network infrastructure, 
servers, IT support, software 
updates 
Software programs needed to 














Unlimited access to transfer pricing 
and other related publications 
Databases for comparables 
Compustat, Bureau van 
Dijk, Moody's, 
Bloomberg 
DEI  License for database 
License to databases for access to 
financial information from 
independent comparable 
companies or transactions 
Macroeconomic analysis  External consultants  DEI and MoF  n/a  Financial resources 
Manuals and technical training 
materials  External consultants  DEI and COHPUCP 
Textbooks for training 
purposes (including for 
transfer pricing and 
general income tax 
training) 
New textbooks 
every two years 
Textbooks for training purposes 
(including for transfer pricing and 





DEI and MoF  n/a 
6 months plus 
additional time to 
draft revisions to 
legislation 




Knowledge databases for tax 
administration and taxpayers   Third party databases 




Public accessibility to legislation and 
administrative guidelines 
Third party website 
developer 
Design website, pay for 
domain fees, site 
maintenance  
Website developers, domain name, 
personnel to maintain/update 
website with recent legislation and 
guidelines  Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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4. Other 
support   
Creation of central forum for 
approval of special tax regimes  External consultants  Honduran 
Government  Feasibility study  6 months 
Personnel to conduct study on how 
to implement said forum. The forum 
will be led by the DEI or MoF 
Secondments  
External consultant, 
foreign tax authority, 
international institution 
DEI 
Send personnel abroad 
to foreign tax authorities 
or receive personnel in 
Honduras from foreign 
tax authorities 
n/a 
Personnel with experience of 
transfer pricing in the region, 
transportation costs, per diem, and 
other compensation for services 
   Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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4. Donor support recommendations Vietnam*   
     
* list not intended to be exhaustive 





Accounting practices   Subject matter experts 
(individuals) 
Central tax level - Tax Policy 
Department, Tax Reform & 
Modernisation Dept, International 










General tax   Subject matter experts 
(individuals) 
Economics/Statistics and 
related knowledge   IBFD & OECD  Provincial tax offices who will be 
handling TP cases 
Transfer pricing (General & 
basic principles as espoused 
in OECD) 
Professional Service Firms 
Central tax level - Tax Policy 
Department, Tax Reform & 
Modernisation Dept, International 
Cooperation Dept & Inspectorate 
Audit practices and effective 
management (e.g. 
procedures in conducting TP 
audits) 
Other tax administrators from 
Asia Pacific region 
APA mechanism/ MAP 
procedure 
Language courses - English 
language courses 
Vietnamese translators 
required for training sessions Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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2. Materials 
Databases for comparables  BvD 
Tax authorities 
ORIANA or Osiris 
database etc 
On-going process 
Donor support - 
Financial resources 
Macroeconomic analysis  External consultants 
Face-to-face 
Draft legislation  Other tax administrators from 
Asia Pacific region 
Databases for tax 
administration  
External consultants & other tax 
administrators from Asia Pacific 
region 
Manuals and technical 
training materials 
Other tax administrators from 





Knowledge databases for Tax 
administration  
External consultants & other tax 
administrators 
Tax authorities  Intranet 
On-going process  Donor support - 
Financial resources  Public accessibility to 
legislation and administrative 
guidelines for tax payers 




Guidance to review and 
amend the legislative 
authority 
Other tax administrators from 
Asia Pacific region 
Tax authorities 
Face-to-face 
On-going process  Donor support - 
Financial assistance 
Secondments  Foreign tax authorities, 
international institutions 
n/a  
Translators  External consultants   Face-to-face  
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Appendix I:  Estimated impact on 
tax collections resulting from TP 
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1.1 Contributions of MNE to total tax revenues Ghana (*) 
               
     2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  Average  Source 
GDP in Ghs mn  17.891,0  18.705,0  19.913,0  21.592,0  22.598,0  23.894,0     IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011) 
in EUR mn  8.321,4  8.700,0  9.261,9  10.042,8  10.510,7  11.113,5     Own calculation (1 Eur = 2.15 Ghs) 
GDP growth  6,2%  4,5%  6,5%  8,4%  4,7%  5,7%  6,06%  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011) 
Tax/GDP ratio  21,30%  12,80%  13,90%  13,90%  12,5%    14,88%  World Bank (Tax to GDP) 
Total tax collection in Ghs mn                      3.811   2.394,24  2.767,91  3.001,29  2.824,75       Own calculation  
in EUR mn                       1.772   1.113,6  1.287,4  1.395,9  1.313,8       Own calculation 
Tax collection growth rate  n/a  -37,17%  15,61%  8,43%  -5,88%    -4,75%  Own calculation 
Corporate Income Tax revenues (CIT) 
in Ghs mn  n/a  733,4  910,2  1.234,2  1.783,9       Ghana - Large taxpayer office 
in EUR mn  n/a  341  423  574  830         
CIT/Total tax   n/a  30,63%  32,88%  41,12%  63,15%    41,95%  Own calculation 
MNE contribution/CIT  n/a  18,63%  20,30%  18,88%  21,13%    19,74%  Ghana - Large taxpayer office 
MNE contribution/Total tax  n/a  5,71%  6,68%  7,76%  13,34%    8,37%  Own calculation  
MNE contribution total in Ghs mn  n/a  136,6  184,8  233,0  376,9       Own calculation 
in EUR mn   n/a  63,5  85,9  108,4  175,3        Own calculation 
(*) Estimates. 
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1.2 Tax growth model Ghana - Scenario 1 (*) 
     
                    Base scenario  
   2009 (**)  2010         
(forecast) 
2011         
(forecast) 
2012         
(forecast) 
2013         
(forecast) 
2014         
(forecast) 
2015         
(forecast) 
2016         
(forecast)  Source 
GDP in Ghs mn  22.598,0  23.894,0  27.160,0  29.146,0  30.938,0  32.867,0  34.948,0  36.502,0  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
in EUR mn  10.510,7  11.113,5  12.632,6  13.556,3  14.389,8  15.287,0  16.254,9  16.977,7  Own calculation (1 EUR = 2,15 Ghs) 
GDP growth  2,60%  5,74%  13,67%  7,31%  6,15%  6,24%  6,33%  4,45%  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
Average tax/GDP ratio  12,50%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average CIT/Total tax   63,15%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average MNE contribution/CIT  21,13%  19,74%  19,74%  19,74%  19,74%  19,74%  19,74%  19,74%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average MNE contribution/Total tax   13,34%  8,37%  8,37%  8,37%  8,37%  8,37%  8,37%  8,37%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Expected total tax Ghs mn  2.824,8  3.555,4  4.041,4  4.336,9  4.603,6  4.890,6  5.200,3  5.431,5  Own calculation  
MNE contribution total (in Ghs mn)   376,8  297,6  338,3  363,0  385,3  409,3  435,3  454,6  Own calculation  
Estimated revenue from MNE in EUR (in mn)  175,3  138,4  157,3  168,8  179,2  190,4  202,4  211,4  Own calculation (1 EUR = 2,15 Ghs) 
  
                  Increase CIT collections from MNEs (*) 
     2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
  Low Impact Scenario   0%  0%  0%  5,0%  2,5%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0% 
  Medium Impact Scenario   0%  0%  0,0%  10,0%  5,0%  2,0%  2,0%  2,0% 
  High Impact Scenario   0%  0%  0,0%  20,0%  10,0%  5,0%  5,0%  5,0% 
     MNE total contribution (in EUR mn) 
 
  
  Base Scenario  175,3  138,4  157,3  168,8  179,2  190,4  202,4  211,4 
  Low Impact Scenario  175,3  138,4  157,3  176,7  191,5  204,6  218,7  229,9 
  Medium Impact Scenario  175,3  138,4  157,3  184,6  204,2  219,4  235,9  249,6 
  High Impact Scenario  175,3  138,4  157,3  200,3  230,7  253,4  278,2  301,1 
 
                    (*) Estimates. The low, medium and high impact scenarios for the possible increase in CIT collections from MNEs were selected for illustrative purposes to offer an insight into potential revenue effects 
depending on the impact of TP reform assumed. 
(**) For 2009, 2009 data was used (not average). This is the reason for the decrease in estimated revenues from MNE in 2010 (138,4) compared to 2009 data (175,3). For 2010, we have used the 2006-2009 
average for CIT/Total tax (41,95%) and MNE contribution/CIT (19,74%); resulting in a lower estimated MNE contribution/Total tax for the years 2010 – 2016 (8,37%) than in 2009 (13,34%). 
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1.3 Tax growth model Ghana - Scenario 2 (*) 
     
             
      Scenario 2 : Base scenario + Annual 1% increase in MNE activities (*) 
   2009 (**)  2010         
(forecast) 
2011         
(forecast) 
2012         
(forecast) 
2013         
(forecast) 
2014         
(forecast) 
2015         
(forecast) 
2016         
(forecast)  Source 
GDP in Ghs mn  22.598,0  23.185,5  27.160,0  29.146,0  30.938,0  32.867,0  34.948,0  36.502,0  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
in EUR mn  10.510,7  10.784,0  12.632,6  13.556,3  14.389,8  15.287,0  16.254,9  16.977,7  Own calculation (1 EUR = 2,15 Ghs) 
GDP growth  2,60%  5,74%  13,67%  7,31%  6,15%  6,24%  6,33%  4,45%  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
Average Tax/GDP ratio  12,50%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  14,88%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average CIT/Total tax   63,15%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  41,95%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average MNE Contribution/CIT  21,13%  22,13%  23,13%  24,13%  25,13%  26,13%  27,13%  28,13%  Own calculation + 1% growth (assumption) 
Average MNE Contribution/Total tax   13,34%  9,28%  9,70%  10,12%  10,54%  10,96%  11,38%  11,80%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Expected Total Tax KSh mn  2.824,8  3.555,4  4.041,4  4.336,9  4.603,6  4.890,6  5.200,3  5.431,5  Own calculation  
MNE Contribution total (in KSh mn)   376,8  330,1  392,1  439,0  485,3  536,1  591,8  640,9  Own calculation  
Estimated revenue from MNE in EUR (in mn)  175,3  153,5  182,4  204,2  225,7  249,3  275,3  298,1  Own calculation (1 EUR = 2,15 Ghs) 
  
             
     
Increase CIT collections from increased MNE activity (*) 
     2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
  Low Impact Scenario   0%  0%  0,0%  5,0%  2,5%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0% 
  Medium Impact Scenario  0%  0%  0,0%  10,0%  5,0%  2,0%  2,0%  2,0% 
  High Impact Scenario  0%  0%  0,0%  20,0%  10,0%  5,0%  5,0%  5,0% 
     MNE total contribution (in EUR mn) 
 
  
  Base Scenario  175,3  153,5  182,4  204,2  225,7  249,3  275,3  298,1 
  Low Impact Scenario  175,3  153,5  182,4  213,3  240,2  266,2  294,8  320,6 
  Medium Impact Scenario  175,3  153,5  182,4  222,4  255,1  283,8  315,4  344,6 
  High Impact Scenario  175,3  153,5  182,4  240,7  286,3  324,2  366,3  407,5    
                    (*) Estimates. The low, medium and high impact scenarios for the possible increase in CIT collections from MNEs were selected for illustrative purposes to offer an insight into potential revenue effects 
depending on the impact of TP reform assumed. 
(**) For 2009, 2009 data was used (not average). This is the reason for the decrease in estimated revenues from MNE in 2010 (153,5) compared to 2009 data (175,3). For 2010, we have used the 2006-2009 
average for CIT/Total tax (41,95%); resulting in a lower estimated MNE contribution/Total tax for the years 2010 – 2016 (9,28% – 11,80%) than in 2009 (13,34%). 
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2.1 Contributions of MNE to total tax revenues Honduras (*) 
               
     2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  Average  Source 
GDP in Hnl bn  133.886,0  142.789,0  151.678,0  157.920,0  154.555,0  158.841,0     IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2011) 
in EUR mn                    
5.024,79   
                  
5.358,92   
                  
5.692,53   
                  
5.926,79   
                  
5.800,50   
                  
5.961,36       Own calculation (1 EUR = 26,6451 Hnl) 
GDP growth  6,1%  6,6%  6,2%  4,1%  -2,1%  2,8%  3,9%  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, April 
2011) 
Tax/GDP ratio  14,50%  15,20%  16,30%  16,00%  14,40%  n/a  15,3%  World Bank (Tax to GDP Table) 
Total tax collection in Hnl                        
19.413   21.703,9  24.723,5  25.267,2  22.255,9  n/a     Own calculation  
in EUR mn                           
9.030  
                    
814,56   
                    
927,88   
                    
948,29   
                    
835,27     n/a      Own calculation (1 EUR = 26,6451 Hnl) 
Corporate Income Tax revenues 
(CIT) in Hnl   n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a        
Tax collection growth rate    11,80%  13,91%  2,20%  -11,92%  n/a  4,00%  Own calculation 
CIT/Total tax  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  19,30%  Assumption based on Honduras Ministry of 
Finance available data 
MNE contribution/ CIT  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a       
MNE contribution/Total tax               9,34%  Assumption based on other country studies 
MNE contribution total      n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a       
                  (*) Estimates. 
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2.2 Tax growth model Honduras -Scenario 1 (*) 
                          Base scenario  (*) 
   2009 (**)  2010          
(forecast) 
2011          
(forecast) 
2012           
(forecast) 
2013         
(forecast) 
2014            
(forecast) 
2015            
(forecast) 
2016          
(forecast)  Source 
GDP in Hnl mn  154.555,0  158.841,0  164.324,0  170.897,0  177.733,0  184.842,0  192.236,0  199.925,0  IMF (Wold Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
in EUR mn  5.800,5  5.961,4  6.167,1  6.413,8  6.670,4  6.937,2  7.214,7  7.503,3  Own calculation (1 EUR = 26,6451 Hnl) 
GDP growth  -2,10%  3,45%  4,00%  4,00%  4,00%  4,00%  4,00%  4,00%  Own calculation (verage 2005-2009) 
Average tax/GDP ratio  14,40%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
CIT/Total tax  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average (E) MNE contribution/Total tax   9,34%  9,34%  9,34%  9,34%  9,34%  9,34%  9,34%  9,34%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Expected total tax Hnl mn  22.255,9  24.620,4  25.470,2  26.489,0  27.548,6  28.650,5  29.796,6  30.988,4  Own calculation  
MNE contribution total (in Hnl mn)   2.078,7  2.299,5  2.378,9  2.474,1  2.573,0  2.676,0  2.783,0  2.894,3  Own calculation  
Estimated revenue from MNE in EUR (in mn)  78,0  86,3  89,3  92,9  96,6  100,4  104,4  108,6  Own calculation (1 EUR = 26,6451 Hnl) 
  
                  Increase CIT collections from MNEs 
     2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
  Low Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  5,0%  2,5%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0% 
  Medium Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  10,0%  5,0%  2,0%  2,0%  2,0% 
  High Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  20,0%  10,0%  5,0%  5,0%  5,0% 
     MNE total contribution (in EUR mn)      
  Base Scenario  78,0  86,3  89,3  92,9  96,6  100,4  104,4  108,6 
  Low Impact Scenario  78,0  86,3  89,3  97,3  103,5  108,4  113,5  118,8 
  Medium Impact Scenario  78,0  86,3  89,3  101,8  110,6  116,7  123,0  129,6 
  High Impact Scenario  78,0  86,3  89,3  110,7  125,5  135,6  146,4  157,9 
 
                    (*) Estimates. The low, medium and high impact scenarios for the possible increase in CIT collections from MNEs were selected for illustrative purposes to offer an insight into potential revenue effects 
depending on the impact of TP reform assumed. 
(**) For 2009, 2009 data was used (not average). 
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2.3 Tax growth model Honduras -Scenario 2 (*) 
                         
                    Base scenario + Annual 1% increase in MNE activities (*) 
   2009 (**)  2010         
(forecast) 
2011        
(forecast) 
2012        
(forecast) 
2013         
(forecast) 
2014         
(forecast) 
2015           
(forecast) 
2016          
(forecast)  Source 
GDP in Hnl mn  154.555,0  158.841,0  164.324,0  170.897,0  177.733,0  184.842,0  192.236,0  199.925,0  IMF (Wold Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
in EUR mn  5.800,5  5.961,4  6.167,1  6.413,8  6.670,4  6.937,2  7.214,7  7.503,3  Own calculation (1 EUR = 26,6451 Hnl) 
GDP growth  -2,10%  3,45%  4,00%  4,00%  4,00%  4,00%  4,00%  4,00%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average Tax/GDP ratio  14,40%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  15,50%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average CIT/Total tax  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  19,30%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average MNE Contribution/CIT  48,39%  49,39%  50,39%  51,39%  52,39%  53,39%  54,39%  55,39%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) +1% 
(assumption) 
Average MNE Contribution/Total tax  9,34%  9,53%  9,73%  9,92%  10,11%  10,31%  10,50%  10,69%  Own calculation 
Expected Total Tax Hnl mn  22.255,9  24.620,4  25.470,2  26.489,0  27.548,6  28.650,5  29.796,6  30.988,4  Own calculation  
MNE Contribution total (in Hnl mn)  2.078,7  2.347,1  2.477,2  2.627,4  2.785,7  2.952,4  3.128,0  3.313,0  Own calculation  
Estimated revenue from MNE in EUR (in mn)  78,0  88,1  93,0  98,6  104,5  110,8  117,4  124,3  Own calculation (1 EUR = 26,6451 Hnl) 
  
             
     
Increase CIT collections from increased MNE activity (*) 
     2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
  Low Impact Scenario   0%  0%  0,00%  5,00%  2,50%  1,00%  1,00%  1,00% 
  Medium Impact Scenario   0%  0%  0,00%  10,00%  5,00%  2,00%  2,00%  2,00% 
  High Impact Scenario   0%  0%  0,00%  20,00%  10,00%  5,00%  5,00%  5,00% 
     MNE total contribution (in EUR mn)      
  Base Scenario  78,0  88,1  93,0  98,6  104,5  110,8  117,4  124,3 
  Low Impact Scenario  78,0  88,1  93,0  103,3  111,8  119,2  126,9  135,1 
  Medium Impact Scenario  78,0  88,1  93,0  107,9  119,2  127,9  137,0  146,7 
  High Impact Scenario  78,0  88,1  93,0  117,2  134,9  147,9  161,8  176,9 
 
                    (*) Estimates. The low, medium and high impact scenarios for the possible increase in CIT collections from MNEs were selected for illustrative purposes to offer an insight into potential revenue effects 
depending on the impact of TP reform assumed. 
(**) For 2009, 2009 data was used (not average). 
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3.1 Contributions of MNE to total tax revenues Kenya (*) 
               
  
   2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  Average  Source 
GDP in KSh mn  1.155.516,0  1.228.598,0  1.314.555,0  1.334.975,0  1.369.578,0  1.437.820,0     IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011) 
in EUR mn  9.479,2  10.078,7  10.783,9  10.951,4  11.235,3  11.795,1     Own calculations (1 EUR = 121,9 KSh) 
GDP growth  6,0%  6,3%  7,0%  1,6%  2,6%     4,7%  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011) 
Tax/GDP ratio  18,7%  17,4%  17,8%  19,1%  19,6%    18,5%  World Bank (Tax to GDP) 
Total tax collection (KSh)                   
216.081   213.776,1  233.990,8  254.980,2  268.437,3       Own calculation 
in EUR mn                        
1.773   1.753,7  1.919,5  2.091,7  2.202,1       Own calculation (1 EUR = 121,9 KSh) 
Tax collection growth rate  n/a  -1,07%  9,5%  9,0%  5,3%    5,7%  Own calculation 
Corporate Income Tax revenues (CIT) in 
KSh mn  n/a  40.125,8  41.322,8  49.440,7  50.197,8       Own calculation 
in EUR mn  n/a  329,2  339,0  405,6  411,8          
CIT/Total tax   n/a  18,77%  17,66%  19,39%  18,7%     18,63%  Ratio: Calculation based on Kenya National Bureau of Statistics data  
MNE contribution/CIT  n/a  20,0%  20,0%  20,0%  20,0%     20,0%  Assumption based on other country studies 
MNE contribution/ Total tax   n/a  3,8%  3,5%  3,9%  3,7%     3,7%  Own calculation  
MNE contribution total   n/a  8.025,2  8.264,6  9.888,1  10.039,6       Own calculation 




   
  
      (*) Estimates. 
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3.2 Tax growth model Kenya - Scenario 1 (*) 
                          Base scenario (*) 
   2009 (**)  2010          
(forecast) 
2011          
(forecast) 
2012       
(forecast) 
2013          
(forecast) 
2014       
(forecast) 
2015       
(forecast) 
2016       
(forecast)  Source 
GDP in KSh mn  1.369.578,0  1.437.820,0  1.520.051,0  1.619.352,0  1.729.717,0  1.847.720,0  1.971.167,0  2.100.775,0  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
in EUR mn  11.235,3  11.795,1  12.469,7  13.284,3  14.189,6  15.157,7  16.170,4  17.233,6  Own calculation (1 EUR= 121,9 KSh) 
GDP growth  2,60%  4,98%  5,72%  6,53%  6,82%  6,82%  6,68%  6,58%  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
Average tax/GDP ratio  19,60%  18,50%  18,50%  18,50%  18,50%  18,50%  18,50%  18,50%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average CIT/Total tax  18,70%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average MNE contribution/CIT  20,00%  20,00%  20,00%  20,00%  20,00%  20,00%  20,00%  20,00%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average (E) MNE contribution/Total tax   3,74%  3,73%  3,73%  3,73%  3,73%  3,73%  3,73%  3,73%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Expected total tax KSh mn  268.437,3  265.996,7  281.209,4  299.580,1  319.997,6  341.828,2  364.665,9  388.643,4  Own calculation 
MNE contribution total (in KSh mn)   10.039,6  9.911,0  10.477,9  11.162,4  11.923,1  12.736,5  13.587,5  14.480,9  Own calculation  
Estimated revenue from MNE in EUR (in mn)  82,4  81,3  86,0  91,6  97,8  104,5  111,5  118,8  Own calculation (1 EUR= 121,9 KSh) 
                     
Increase CIT collections from MNEs (*)   
   2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016   
Low Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  5,0%  2,5%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0%   
Medium Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  10,0%  5,0%  2,0%  2,0%  2,0%   
High Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  20,0%  10,0%  5,0%  5,0%  5,0%   
   MNE total contribution (in EUR mn)        
Base Scenario  82,4  81,3  86,0  91,6  97,8  104,5  111,5  118,8   
Low Impact Scenario  82,4  81,3  86,0  95,9  104,5  112,2  120,3  128,9   
Medium Impact Scenario  82,4  81,3  86,0  100,2  111,4  120,3  129,7  139,6   
High Impact Scenario  82,4  81,3  86,0  108,8  125,9  138,8  152,8  167,7   
                   
(*) Estimates. The low, medium and high impact scenarios for the possible increase in CIT collections from MNEs were selected for illustrative purposes to offer an insight into potential revenue effects 
depending on the impact of TP reform assumed. 
(**) For 2009, 2009 data was used (not average).                     Transfer pricing and developing countries 
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3.3 Tax growth model Kenya -Scenario 2 (*)       
             
     
Base scenario + Annual 1% increase in MNE activities (*) 
   2009 (**)  2010         
(forecast) 
2011       
(forecast) 
2012      
(forecast) 
2013           
(forecast) 
2014         
(forecast) 
2015          
(forecast) 
2016         
(forecast)  Source 
GDP in KSh mn  1.369.578,0  1.437.820,0  1.520.051,0  1.619.352,0  1.729.717,0  1.847.720,0  1.971.167,0  2.100.775,0  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
in EUR mn  11.235,3  11.794,8  12.469,4  13.284,0  14.189,3  84.370,8  90.007,6  95.925,8  Own calculation (currency: 1EUR= 121,9 
KSh) 
GDP growth  2,60%  4,98%  5,72%  6,53%  6,82%  6,82%  6,68%  6,58%  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
Average Tax/GDP ratio  19,60%  18,23%  18,23%  18,23%  18,23%  18,23%  18,23%  18,23%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average CIT/Total tax  18,70%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  18,63%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average MNE contribution/CIT  20,00%  21,00%  22,00%  23,00%  24,00%  25,00%  26,00%  27,00%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Average MNE contribution/Total tax  3,74%  3,91%  4,10%  4,28%  4,47%  4,66%  4,84%  5,03%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Expected total tax KSh mn  268.437,3  262.042,7  277.029,3  295.126,9  315.240,9  336.747,0  359.245,2  382.866,2  Own calculation 
MNE contribution total (in KSh mn)  10.039,6  10.251,9  11.354,3  12.645,9  14.095,1  15.684,0  17.401,1  19.258,6  Own calculation  
Estimated revenue from MNE in EUR (in mn)  82,4  84,1  93,1  103,7  115,6  128,7  142,7  158,0  Own calculation (currency: 1EUR= 121,9 
KSh) 
                    
Increase CIT collections from increased MNE activity (*)   
   2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
 
Low Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  5,0%  2,5%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0%   
Medium Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  10,0%  5,0%  2,0%  2,0%  2,0%   
High Impact Scenario  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  20,0%  10,0%  5,0%  5,0%  5,0%   
   MNE total contribution (in EUR mn)        
Base Scenario  82,4  84,1  93,1  103,7  115,6  128,7  142,7  158,0   
Low Impact Scenario  82,4  84,1  93,1  108,4  123,0  137,3  152,7  169,5   
Medium Impact Scenario  82,4  84,1  93,1  113,1  130,6  146,2  163,3  181,8   
High Impact Scenario  82,4  84,1  93,1  122,4  146,5  166,9  189,3  214,0   
           
  
      (*) Estimates. The low, medium and high impact scenarios for the possible increase in CIT collections from MNEs were selected for illustrative purposes to offer an insight into potential revenue effects 
depending on the impact of TP reform assumed. 
(**) For 2009, 2009 data was used (not average). 
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4.1 Contributions of MNE to total tax revenues Vietnam (*) 
               
  
   2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  Average  Source 
GDP in VND mn  393.030.768,0  425.373.269,0  461.342.860,0  490.459.000,0  516.565.749,0  551.600.000,0     IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011) 
in EUR mn  13.511,2  14.623,0  15.859,5  16.860,4  17.757,9  18.962,3     Own calculation (1 EUR= 29.089,34VND)  
GDP growth  8,4%  8,2%  8,5%  6,3%  5,3%  6,8%  7,3%  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011) 
Tax/GDP ratio  26,2%  27,1%  26,2%  26,4%      26,57%  Own calculation 
Total tax collection (VND)             
102.974.061  
           
115.276.156  
           
120.871.829  
           
129.481.176  
                         
-          Assumption based on Vietnam country study 
in EUR mn                       
3.540  
                    
3.963  
                    
4.155  
                    
4.451          Own calculation (1 EUR= 29.089,34VND)  
Tax collection growth rate     10,67%  4,85%  7,12%        7,5%  Own calculation 
(A) CIT/Total tax   n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a          
(B) MNE Contribution/Total tax  8,4%  9,2%  9,9%  10,5%  n/a     9,5%  Assumption based on Vietnam country study 
Revenues from MNE in VND 
mn  
               
8.649.821  
             
10.605.406  
             
11.966.311  
             
13.595.523          Own calculation 
 in EUR mn                      
297,4  
                    
364,6  
                    
411,4  
                    
467,4            Own calculation (1 EUR=29.089,34) 
   
                    
(*) Estimates. 
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4.2 Tax growth model Vietnam - Scenario 1 (*) 
     
                    Base scenario (*) 
   2009 (**)  2010             
(forecast) 
2011                 
(forecast) 
2012                 
(forecast) 
2013               
(forecast) 
2014              
(forecast) 
2015                
(forecast) 
2016                
(forecast)  Source 
GDP in VND mn  516.565.749,0  551.609.000,0  586.132.624,0  625.705.580,0  670.913.391,0  720.792.571,0  774.815.386,0  832.887.166,0  IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
in EUR mn  17.757,9  18.962,6  20.149,4  21.509,8  23.063,9  24.778,6  26.635,7  28.632,0  Own calculation (1 EUR= 29.089,34 VND) 
GDP growth  5,30%  6,26%  6,75%  7,23%  7,43%  7,49%  7,49%     IMF (World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2011) 
Average tax/GDP ratio  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
CIT/Total tax   29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  Assumption based on data available from 
the Ministry of Finance 
MNE Contribution/ CIT   32,02%  32,02%  32,02%  32,02%  32,02%  32,02%  32,02%  32,02%  Own calculation 
Average MNE contribution/Total tax  9,51%  9,51%  9,51%  9,51%  9,51%  9,51%  9,51%  9,51%  Own calculation (average 2005-2009) 
Expected total tax VND mn  137.148.206,4  146.452.189,5  155.618.211,7  166.124.831,5  178.127.505,3  191.370.427,6  205.713.485,0  221.131.542,6  Own calculation 
MNE contribution total (in VND mn)  13.042.794,4  13.927.603,2  14.799.291,9  15.798.471,5  16.939.925,8  18.199.327,7  19.563.352,4  21.029.609,7  Own calculation 
Estimated revenue from MNE in 
EUR (in mn)  448,4  478,8  508,8  543,1  582,3  625,6  672,5  722,9  Own calculation (1 EUR= 29.089,34 VND) 
  
                  Increase CIT collections from MNEs (*) 
     2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
  Low Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  5,0%  2,5%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0% 
  Medium Impact Scenario  0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  10,0%  5,0%  2,0%  2,0%  2,0% 
  High Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  20,0%  10,0%  5,0%  5,0%  5,0% 
     MNE total Contribution (in EUR mn)      
  Base Scenario  448,4  478,8  508,8  543,1  582,3  625,6  672,5  722,9 
  Low Impact Scenario  448,4  478,8  508,8  568,5  622,0  671,5  725,1  782,8 
  Medium Impact Scenario  448,4  478,8  508,8  594,0  662,9  719,5  780,7  846,8 
  High Impact Scenario  448,4  478,8  508,8  644,9  748,6  829,3  917,7  1.013,9 
 
                    (*) Estimates. The low, medium and high impact scenarios for the possible increase in CIT collections from MNEs were selected for illustrative purposes to offer an insight into potential revenue effects 
depending on the impact of TP reform assumed. 
(**) For 2009, 2009 data was used (not average). 
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4.3 Tax growth model Vietnam - Scenario 2 (*) 
     
                    Base scenario + Annual 1% increase in MNE activities (*) 
   2009 (**)  2010             
(forecast) 
2011              
(forecast) 
2012              
(forecast) 
2013            
(forecast) 
2014             
(forecast) 
2015            
(forecast) 
2016               
(forecast)  Source 
GDP in VND mn  516.565.749,0  551.609.000,0  586.132.624,0  625.705.580,0  670.913.391,0  720.792.571,0  774.815.386,0  26.635,7  IMF (World Economic Outlook 
Database, April 2011) 
in EUR mn  17.757,9  18.962,6  20.149,4  21.509,8  23.063,9  24.778,6  26.635,7  28.632,0  Own calculation (1 EUR= 
29089,34 VND) 
GDP growth  5,30%  6,26%  6,75%  7,23%  7,43%  7,49%  7,49%  n/a  IMF (World Economic Outlook 
Database, April 2011) 
Average tax/GDP ratio  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  26,55%  Own calculation (average 2005-
2009) 
CIT/Total tax   29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70%  29,70% 
Assumption based on data 
available from the Ministry of 
Finance 
Average MNE contribution/CIT  32,02%  33,02%  34,02%  35,02%  36,02%  37,02%  38,02%  39,02%  Own calculation 
Average MNE contribution/Total tax  9,51%  9,81%  10,10%  10,40%  10,70%  11,00%  11,29%  11,59%  Own calculation (average 2005-
2009) 
Expected total tax VND mn  137.148.206,4  146.452.189,5  155.618.211,7  166.124.831,5  178.127.505,3  191.370.427,6  205.713.485,0  221.131.542,6  Own calculation 
MNE contribution total (in VND mn)  13.042.794,4  14.362.566,2  15.723.664,1  17.278.643,7  19.056.080,5  21.041.178,5  23.229.166,7  25.626.934,5  Own calculation 
Estimated revenue from MNE in EUR 
(in mn)  448,4  493,7  540,5  594,0  655,1  723,3  798,5  881,0  Own calculation (1 EUR= 
29089,34 VND) 
  
                  Increase CIT collections from increased MNE activity (*) 
     2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
  Low Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  5,0%  2,5%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0% 
  Medium Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  10,0%  5,0%  2,0%  2,0%  2,0% 
  High Impact Scenario   0,0%  0,0%  0,0%  20,0%  10,0%  5,0%  5,0%  5,0% 
     MNE total contribution (in EUR mn)      
  Base Scenario  448,4  493,7  540,5  594,0  655,1  723,3  798,5  881,0 
  Low Impact Scenario  448,4  493,7  540,5  621,0  697,6  772,9  855,8  946,8 
  Medium Impact Scenario  448,4  493,7  540,5  648,0  741,5  824,6  916,3  1.017,1 
  High Impact Scenario  448,4  493,7  540,5  702,1  833,4  943,3  1.065,7  1.201,4 
 
                    (*) Estimates. The low, medium and high impact scenarios for the possible increase in CIT collections from MNEs were selected for illustrative purposes to offer an insight into potential revenue effects 
depending on the impact of TP reform assumed. 
(**) For 2009, 2009 data was used (not average). 
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Appendix J:  Examples from Kenya 
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Box 1: Thin-capitalisation rules in Kenya 
Thin-capitalisation rules in Kenya apply where financial assistance is provided to a resident company by a related 
non-resident company that controls the resident company, and when the loan exceeds the greater of: 
- three times the sum of revenue reserves and the issued, paid-up share capital; 
- the sum of all loans acquired by the company prior to 16 June 1986 and still outstanding at the time of assessing of 
the company‟s capitalisation. 
An interest payment on that part of the loan that exceeds the permissible ratio of 3:1 is not deductible for tax 
purposes. If, however, the entity is within the permissible ratio, the payments are deductible. 
 
Box 2: Kenyan Revenue Authorities v. Unilever Kenya Ltd. (2005)  
In 2005, the Kenyan revenue authorities lost a landmark court case, which forced the Ministry of Finance to quickly develop TP 
legislation (which was enacted only one year later, in 2006). 
In the case, Unilever Kenya Ltd. had manufactured and sold various household goods to Unilever Uganda Ltd. (both entities are 
part of the UK-based Unilever group and related parties under section 18 of the then Kenyan Income Tax Act). The Kenyan 
Revenue Authorities argued that, as regards the years 1995 and 1996, the prices were not at arm‟s length and they furthermore 




The feature of the case was that the presiding judge argued, on a technicality, that, in the absence of clear TP rules, the taxpayer 
was entitled to rely on the OECD Guidelines or other international best practice. Hence, disregarding the economics of the case, 
the judge ruled that the then section 18(3) of the Income Tax Act was inadequate to guide the taxpayer and that, therefore, the 
revenue authorities could not rely on these rules when enforcing transfer pricing. 
   
Cost plus remuneration 
Manufacture/sale of 
goods 
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Appendix K:  Special tax and 
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Appendix K: Special tax and incentive schemes in selected countries  
 
Ghana    carry-forward of losses for a 5-year period for companies engaged in agro processing, mining, 
tourism, software development, manufacturing mainly for export and farming 
  reduced corporate income tax rates ranging from 0% to 20% for agro-processing businesses 
depending on their location 
  corporate income tax holidays of 10 years for companies engaged in tree crop farming, cattle 
farming, and of 5 years for agro processing, livestock, fish and cash crop farming  
  accelerated capital allowances of up to 80% of capital costs incurred in the 1st year of acquisition 
for companies in the mining industry 
  capital allowances at 20% on all expenditure incurred for the purposes of petroleum operations 
from the year in which the petroleum contractor first produces petroleum for sale 
Honduras    temporary import regimes, maquila regimes or special processing zones (‘Ley de Zonas 
Industriales de Procesamiento para Exportaciones’) 
  special tax incentives to spur tourism (‘Ley de Incentivos al Turismo’) 
  advantaged industries: agriculture, tourism, telecommunications, infrastructure, alternative energy, 
maquila sector 
  approx. 90% of MNEs operate under tax preference regimes (2010)  
Kenya    export processing zones: companies located in an approved export processing zone, principally to 
export goods, are taxed at a zero rate of income tax for 10 years from commencement of trading 
and at a rate of 25% for the next 10 years 
  investment deduction: qualifying investments exceeding KES 200 million (USD 2.38 mn/ 
EUR 1.70 mn) incurred outside Nairobi/municipalities of Mombasa or Kisumu are allowed an 
investment deduction of 150%; all other qualifying investments are allowed a 100% investment 
deduction in the year the asset is put into service 
  industrial building allowance: hostels and certified education buildings qualify for an industrial 
building allowance at a rate of 50% on a straight-line basis/qualifying leased residential or 
commercial buildings qualify for an industrial building allowance at a rate of 25%/other qualifying 
buildings qualify for an industrial building allowance at a rate of 10% 
  wear and tear allowance: expenditures incurred on heavy earth-moving equipment qualify for a 
wear and tear allowance at a rate of 37.5%, while other self-propelled vehicles (including aircraft) 
qualify for a wear and tear allowance at a rate of 25%. Computers and peripheral computer 
hardware qualify for a wear and tear allowance at a rate of 30%. Capital allowances were Transfer pricing and developing countries   
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introduced, effective 1 January 2010, at a rate of 20% for computer software and 20% for 
telecommunications equipment not falling within the 12.5% category referred to below, purchased 
and used by telecommunications operators. Both these allowances are computed on a straight-line 
basis. All other machinery (including ships) qualifies for a wear and tear allowance at a rate of 
12.5% 
  listed companies: companies listed at the Nairobi Stock Exchange are entitled to reduced rates of 
income tax for a period, depending on the proportion of share capital listed 
Vietnam    tax incentives are based on the location of the enterprise (Decree 24/2007/ND-CP) 
  export-based  incentives  accorded  to  the  textile  and  garment  sectors  were  abolished  in  2007 
(accession to WTO), subject to certain exceptions 
  reduced income tax rates of 10% and 20% apply for a 10-15 year period for enterprises set up in 
encouraged sectors or locations 
  tax exemptions are available from 2–4 years and a 50% reduction for a further period of 2–9 years 
for eligible taxpayers (which are subject to the standard tax rates following this period) 
  where the taxpayer fails to make a profit within 3 years from the year of revenue generation, the 
period of tax exemption and reduction will be calculated from the 4th year 
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Appendix L: List of tax treaties signed by selected countries 
based on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) 90 
Ghana 
Total number of tax treaties signed, 1 June 2010 
 
Partner  Type of agreement  Date of signature 
Belgium  Income and Capital  20-Jun-05 
Denmark  Income and Capital  22-Dec-54 
France  Income and Capital  5-Apr-93 
Italy  Income  19-Feb-04 
Netherlands  Income  10-Mar-08 
Serbia  Income and Capital  25-Apr-00 
South Africa  Income and Capital  2-Nov-04 
United Kingdom  Income and Capital  20-Jan-93 
 
Honduras 
Total number of tax treaties signed, 1 June 2010 
 
Partner  Type of agreement  Date of signature 






Total number of tax treaties signed, 1 June 2010 
 
Partner  Type of agreement  Date of signature 
Canada  Income and Capital  27-Apr-83 
Denmark  Income and Capital  13-Dec-72 
France  Income  4-Dec-07 
Germany  Income and Capital  17-May-77 
India  Income and Capital  12-Apr-85 
Italy  Income and Capital  15-Oct-79 




                                                             
 
90 As of 1 June 2010, see http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4505&lang=1. We have not checked the accuracy of this data and have not investigated 
whether all of the DTAs listed have been ratified. Transfer pricing and developing countries   
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Norway  Income and Capital  13-Dec-72 
Sweden  Income and Capital  28-Jun-73 
United Kingdom  Income and Capital  31-Jul-73 




Total number of tax treaties signed, 1 June 2010 
 
Partner  Type of agreement   Date of signature 
Algeria   Income and Capital   5-Dec-99 
Australia   Income and Capital   13-Apr-92 
Austria   Income and Capital   2-Jun-08 
Bangladesh   Income   22-Mar-04 
Belarus   Income and Capital   24-Apr-97 
Bulgaria   Income   24-May-96 
Canada   Income and Capital  14-Nov-97 
China   Income and Capital   17-May-95 
Cuba  Income   26-Oct-02 
Czech Republic   Income and Capital   23-May-97 
Denmark   Income and Capital   31-May-95 
Finland  Income   21-Nov-01 
France   Income and Capital   10-Feb-93 
Germany   Income and Capital   16-Nov-95 
Hong Kong, China  Income   16-Dec-08 
Hungary  Income and Capital   26-Aug-94 
Iceland   Income and Capital   1-Apr-02 
India   Income and Capital   7-Sep-94 
Indonesia  Income   22-Dec-97 
Ireland   Income   10-Mar-08 
Israel   Income and Capital  4-Aug-09 
Italy   Income  26-Nov-96 
Japan   Income and Capital   24-Oct-95 
Korea, DPR  Income   3-May-02 
Korea, Republic of   Income   20-May-94 
Lao PR   Income   14-Jan-96 
Luxembourg   Income and Capital   4-Mar-96 
Malaysia  Income and Capital   7-Sep-95 
Mongolia   Income and Capital   9-May-96 
Myanmar   Income  12-May-00 
Netherlands  Income and Capital  24-Jan-95 Transfer pricing and developing countries   
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Norway   Income and Capital   1-Jun-95 
Pakistan   Income   25-Mar-04 
Philippines   Income  14-Nov-01 
Poland   Income and Capital   31-Aug-94 
Qatar  Income   8-Mar-09 
Romania   Income and Capital   8-Jul-95 
Russian Federation   Income and Capital   1-Jan-02 
Seychelles  Income   4-Oct-05 
Singapore   Income and Capital   2-Mar-94 
Slovakia  Income   27-Oct-08 
Spain   Income  7-Mar-05 
Sri Lanka   Income   2-Nov-05 
Sweden   Income and Capital   24-Mar-94 
Switzerland   Income and Capital  6-May-96 
Taiwan Province of China  Income and Capital   6-Apr-98 
Thailand   Income and Capital   23-Dec-92 
Ukraine  Income and Capital   8-Apr-96 
United Kingdom   Income and Capital   9-Apr-94 
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Appendix M:  Donor support to date 
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Appendix M: Donor support up to the present in selected countries  
 
Ghana    GIZ (formerly GTZ) provided technical support in the area of TP  
  GIZ/UN Development Programme‟s Special Unit on South-South Cooperation provided funding for 
online courses for tax officials from several African states (inc. Ghana) on international taxation 
(fundamentals of tax treaties, residence, permanent establishments and passive income)91 
  Christian Aid published independent reports on TP in Ghana and its potential implications in the form 
of lost revenue and the impact on the quality of life of the poor in Ghana 
  Participation of tax officials in multilateral dialogue events on TP (OECD Global relations 
programme) 
Honduras    Tax officials have attended training events sponsored by 
- US Treasury Department 
- Argentinean Federal Administration of Public Revenues 
- Mexican Institutor Mexican de Contenders Publics  
- Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
  Cooperation with domestic partners such as the Central Bank of Honduras and the Colegio 
Hondureño de Profesionales Universitarios de Contaduría Publica (COHPUCP) 
Kenya    Kenya has received assistance in the area of indirect taxation, namely in preparation for the 
introduction of VAT. The local authorities state that this assistance was key to successfully 
implementing VAT 
  Participation of tax officials in multilateral dialogue events on TP (OECD Global relations 
programme) 
  GIZ/UN Development Programme‟s Special Unit on South-South Cooperation provided funding for 
online courses for tax officials from several African states (inc. Kenya) on international taxation 
(fundamentals of tax treaties, residence, permanent establishments and passive income)92 
Vietnam    The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) assisted Vietnam in  
- conducting  training  whereby  one/two  tax  experts  from  the  Japanese  National  Tax 
Agency trained tax officials on TP in Vietnam 




                                                             
 
91 Wright, T. N., (2010) „U.N. Groups Fund Online Courses for African Tax Officials in Nine Countries‟, Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report 548, International Tax 
Centre, 9 September 2010. 
92 Wright, T. N., (2010) op. cit. Transfer pricing and developing countries   
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at the offices of the Japanese National Tax Agency or three-month intensive on-the-job 
training) 
  The  Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB)  conducted  TP  training  classes  for  tax  officials  during 
introduction of the TP circulars 
  Participation  of  tax  officials  in  multilateral  dialogue  events  on  TP  (OECD  Global  relations 
programme) 
  In addition, assistance of a more general nature was provided by 
- the UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
- the World Bank (tax administration and modernisation) 
- Department for International Development (DFID) 
- the IMF (developing and modernising the administrative infrastructure, including IT) 
- the International Finance Corporation (IFC, models, techniques for ratio analysis of 
unincorporated businesses, risk-based auditing techniques for tax audits) 
- the EU Delegation in Vietnam 
- the US Embassy (assistance in areas of improving collections and auditing; banking 
money supervision and anti-money laundering), the US Treasury and the US Trade and 
Development Agency 
- specific countries: Germany, France and Luxembourg 
 Transfer pricing and developing countries   
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Appendix N:  Cost-benefit analysis 
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1. Cost estimation of TP reform in Kenya* 
             
Anticipated cost            Investment 
costs (€)  
Recurring 
costs (€) 
                
1. Training              
       Hours  Cost/hour       
1.1 Transfer pricing     150   490   73.511   18.378  
1.2 Economics/Statistics and related knowledge     16   490   7.841   1.960  
1.3 Audit practices and effective management (e.g. data processing)    16   490   7.841   1.960  
1.4 APA mechanism/ MAP procedure    18   490   8.821   2.205  
                
2. Materials                
                
2.1 Databases for comparables        35.005   8.751  
2.2 Macroeconomic analysis         24.504   6.126  
2.3 Manuals and technical training materials         7.001   1.750  
2.4 Draft legislation        7.001   1.750  
2.5 Databases for tax administrations (e.g. online forum)        14.002   3.501  
             
3. Other support                
3.1 Secondments (estimated cost for 6 months)        35.005     
                
Subtotals        220.532   46.382  
Total anticipated costs (€)           266.913  
* The following figures represent rounded high-level estimations, which have been initially prepared in USD. For the currency conversion, we have used 
the USD/EUR exchange rate of 30 May 2011 (0,7001). It should be noted that this estimation does not take into consideration further administrative 
costs linked to the TP team/unit, or other items linked to TP reform, such as costs related to the legislative approval of TP reform or the costs of  
related judiciary. 
     Transfer pricing and developing countries   
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2. Cost estimation of TP reform in Ghana* 
             
Anticipated cost            Investment 
costs (€)  
Recurring 
costs (€) 
                
1. Setting up of a Transfer Pricing unit/team             
                
1.1 Personnel selection             
▪  Anticipated number of staff required      6       
▪  Estimated cost per FTE**      3.501   21.003     
1.2 Transfer Pricing unit/team             
▪  Anticipated number of staff required       16        
▪  Estimated cost per FTE**      7.001   112.016     
** FTE = Full-time employee             
                
2. Training                 
      
Hours  Cost/hour       
2.1 General tax and accounting practices 
 
100   490  49.007   12.252  
2.2 Transfer pricing     600   490   294.042   73.511  
2.3 Economics/Statistics and related knowledge     70   490   34.305   8.576  
2.4 Audit practices and effective management (e.g. data 
processing)    50   490   24.504   6.126  
2.5 Tax administration (audit procedures, internal structure, checks 
and balances)     50   490   24.504   6.126  
2.6 APA mechanism/ MAP procedure    80   490   39.206   9.801  
                
3. Materials                
                
3.1 IT Hardware /infrastructure support        35.005   8.751  
3.2 Databases for comparables        35.005   8.751  
3.3 Macroeconomic analysis         24.504   6.126  
3.4 Manuals and technical training materials         7.001   1.750  
3.5 Draft legislation        21.003   5.251  
3.6 Databases for tax administrations (e.g. online forum)        14.002   3.501  
                
4. Other materials                
4.1 Knowledge databases for tax administration and taxpayers         21.003   5.251  
4.2 Public accessibility of legislation and administration guidelines         14.002   3.501  
                
5. Other support                
5.1 Secondments (estimated cost for 6 months)        35.005     
                
Subtotals        805.115   159.273  
Total anticipated costs (€)           964.388  
* See remark in section 1 (Kenya).   
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3. Cost estimation of TP reform in Honduras* 
             
Anticipated cost            Investment 
costs (€)  
Recurring costs 
(€) 
                
1. Setting up of a Transfer Pricing unit/team             
                
1.1 Transfer Pricing unit/team             
▪  Anticipated number of staff required       10        
▪  Estimated cost per FTE**      28.004   280.040     
** FTE = Full-time employee             
                
2. Training                 
      
Hours  Cost/hour       
2.1 General tax and accounting practices 
 
60   490   29.404   7.351  
2.2 Transfer Pricing     300   490   147.021   36.755  
2.3 Income tax    80   490   39.206   9.801  
2.4 Economics/Statistics and related knowledge     36   490   17.643   4.411  
2.5 Audit practices and effective management (e.g. data processing)    30   490   14.702   3.676  
2.6 Tax administration (audit procedures, internal structure, checks and 
balances)     30   490   14.702   3.676  
2.7 APA mechanism/ MAP procedure    40   490   19.603   4.901  
2.8 Language courses    30   245   7.351   1.838  
                
3. Materials                
                
3.1 IT Hardware/infrastructure support        35.005   8.751  
3.2 Databases for comparables        35.005   8.751  
3.3 Macroeconomic analysis         24.504   6.126  
3.4 Manuals and technical training materials         7.001   1.750  
3.5 Draft legislation        7.001   1.750  
3.6 Databases for tax administrations (e.g. online forum)        14.002   3.501  
                
4. Other materials                
4.1 Knowledge databases for tax administration and taxpayers         2.450   613  
4.2 Public accessibility of legislation and administration guidelines         2.450   613  
                
5. Other support                
                
5.1 Secondments (estimated cost for 6 months)        35.005     
                
Subtotals        732.095   104.262  
Total anticipated costs (€)           836.357  
* See remark in section 1 (Kenya).   
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4. Cost estimation of TP reform in Vietnam* 
             
Anticipated cost            Investment 
costs (€)  
Recurring 
costs (€) 
                
1. Training                 
       Hours  Cost/hour       
1.1 General tax and accounting practices 
 
          70    490   34.305   8.576  
1.2 Transfer pricing            180    490   88.213   22.053  
1.3 Economics/Statistics and related knowledge               60    490  29.404   7.351  
1.4 Audit practices and effective management (e.g. data processing)              60    490  29.404   7.351  
1.5 APA mechanism/ MAP procedure              60    490  29.404   7.351  
1.6 Language courses              70    245    17.152   4.288  
                
2. Materials                
                
2.1 Databases for comparables        35.005   8.751  
2.2 Macroeconomic analysis         24.504   6.126  
2.3 Manuals and technical training materials         7.001   1.750  
2.4 Draft legislation        14.002   3.501  
2.5 Databases for tax administrations (e.g. online forum)        14.002   3.501  
                
3. Other materials                
                
3.1 Knowledge databases for tax administration and taxpayers         2.450   613  
3.2 Public accessibility of legislation and administration guidelines         2.450   613  
                
4. Other support                
                
4.1 Secondments (estimated cost for 6 months)        35.005     
                
Subtotals        362.302   81.824  
Total anticipated costs (€)           444.126  
* See remark in section 1 (Kenya).   
   Transfer pricing and developing countries   
106 | P a g e  
 


































   Transfer pricing and developing countries   
107 | P a g e  
 
Appendix O: In a nutshell – challenges/options/donor support93 
 
Challenges faced by developing 
countries 
Options  Donor support  
Resources     
(1)  Lack of qualified and 
experienced staff 
Setting up a specialist 
TP unit, training 
existing staff, hiring in 
external experts 
Recommendations regarding structures and 
organisational aspects, also with respect to 
collaboration by national, regional and local 
administrations; development of HR strategies 
and choice of suitable staff; setting up training 
schedules/facilities and choice of training 
providers; implementation of internal risk 
management, sharing best practices. 
(2)  Lack of in-depth 
understanding of TP and lack 




v. local approach 
Provision of available guidance (preparation of a 
“TP package”) and international standards with 
respect to definitions (e.g. related parties); 
assistance in identifying local specialties, if 
necessary (e.g. dominance of certain industry 
sectors). 
(3)  Promotion of good 
governance and 
independence within the tax 
administration and the TP 
unit 






Development and implementation of 
appropriate, efficient HR strategies; provision of 
examples of risk management frameworks and 
independence requirements; assistance in 
building intrinsic motivation and incentive 
schemes; sharing best practices. 
(4)  Non-availability of resources 
and tools to collect and 
process necessary 
information  
Collection of data and 
post-evaluation based 
on locally developed 
criteria v. selection of 
information required for 
assessment and audit 
purposes and gradual 
implementation of IT 
tools 
Assistance with respect to the evaluation of 
taxpayer information; identification of necessary 
information and setting up IT systems including 
training on how to use these systems; sharing 
best practices with respect to risk analysis and 
identification of appropriate criteria to determine 
high-risk transactions. 
 
Legal Framework     
(1)  Existing local accounting 
standards need to serve as 
starting point for general tax 
and TP accounting 
Use of accounting 
provisions as a 
foundation for TP 
legislation v. creation of 
a different set of 
standards 
Assistance in evaluating and assessing local 
accounting standards; amendments and 
improvement of existing provisions based on 
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(2)  Non-existence of TP 
legislation  
Orientation towards 
legislation existing in 
other (developing) 
countries v. local 
approach 
Assistance in drafting TP legislation oriented 
towards international standards, provision of 
examples of existing TP legislation in local 
language and illustration of implications and 
experience. Development of a phased approach 
and prioritisation of action with regard to the 
implementation of TP legislation. 
Endorsement     
(1)  Preparation and assistance 
of taxpayers and involved 
stakeholder groups with 
respect to new local TP 
legislation 
Top-down approach v. 
involvement of selected 
parties and taxpayers 
Development of phased approaches with 
respect to the implementation of TP legislation; 
share of experience with respect to taxpayer 
involvement and funding of workshops and 
discussion platforms. 
(2)  Non-existence of sufficient 
local comparables to 
evaluate the arm’s length 
nature of transactions and 
no access to commonly used 
databases 





of local databases  
Financing access to internationally used 
databases in the area of TP, provision of 
guidance on how to use comparables and how 
to carry out necessary adjustments, e.g. with 
respect to country-specific adjustments if no 
local comparables are available (e.g. as applied 
between Latin America and the USA); possible 
third-party research contracted to assess the 
comparability of economic environments 
between geographically remote (developing) 
countries. 
(3)  Evaluation and validation of 
TP legislation adopted and 
review of administrative 
implementation, in particular 
regarding TP audits 
Review and, if 
necessary, amendment 
of legislation as 
implemented; review of 
tax audit practices and 
refining audit strategies  
Assistance by more-experienced tax 
administrations; joint investigations; sharing of 
risk assessment approaches; selection and 
analysis of TP audit outcomes. 
 
 
(4)  Implementation and 
enforcement of adequate TP 
documentation requirements 




regular reviews of 
existing documentation; 
mandatory submission 
of TP documentation v. 
submission on request; 
penalty schemes 
Discussion of implications of policy choices and 
identification of necessary changes with regard 
to organisational structures and allocation of 
resources; provision of examples of legislation 
in force and experience with respect to penalty 
schemes. 
 
(5)  Integration of further 




specific measures such 
as APA and simplified 
compliance 
procedures, e.g. for 
small and medium-
sized taxpayers 
Introduction to available tools, legislative and 
administrative implications, costs and benefits. 
More-experienced tax officials should assist in 
drafting rules or guide local tax officials through 
the concept and use of these measures. 
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(1)  Non-existence of sufficient 
DTA and TIEA 
Signature of DTAs 
during the preparation 
of TP legislation v. 
preparing negotiations 
once TP legislation is in 
place 
Offering assistance on signing DTAs, selection 
of partners and choice of model convention; 
fostering understanding of implications and 
application of provisions, guidance on legal and 
procedural implications (e.g. of dispute 
resolution mechanisms, exchange of 
information). 
 